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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs' statement of jurisdiction is insufficient. This Court has jurisdiction of 
the appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether plaintiffs' three fraud-related arguments are rendered moot by the jury 
verdict of no negligence in defendants' care of Shelly Hip well. 
Standard of Review: De novo. Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 
1989). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is presented for the first time in this Court 
because plaintiffs' arguments did not become moot until after the jury verdict in the 
district court. 
2. Whether the district court properly excluded the testimony of plaintiffs' expert 
witness regarding emergency room standard of care based on the witness' lack of 
qualifications. 
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 
339, 347 (Utah 1996). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised by pretrial motion, trial objection, and 
motion for partial directed verdict. (R. 3971-72, 4568-69; Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 381-402, 
456-59; Tr. 5011, Vol. IX, at 1788-92, 1798-1802, 1814-15.) 
3. Whether plaintiffs' negligence claim against McKay-Dee Hospital is barred by 
the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
Standard of Review: De novo. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 334, 
338 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation of Issue: The Hospital raised this issue in the prior appeal, as well as 
before and after the statute of limitations trial. (R. 1501, 1887, 2169, 2435.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The second issue, stated above, is governed by Utah R. Evid. 702. The third issue 
is governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1). Both 
provisions are set forth verbatim in the Addendum (hereafter "Add.," at 106-07), attached 
hereto.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiffs allege that defendants' 
negligence in 1988 proximately caused the death of Shelly Hipwell in 1992. (Third 
Amended Complaint, R. 277.) Plaintiffs previously obtained a monetary settlement from 
the University of Utah Medical Center for this same injury and then obtained an 
additional recovery from their prior legal counsel for malpractice in reaching that 
settlement. See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993). 
This action, commenced in 1992, was initially decided on summary judgment as 
time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions. 
1
 Plaintiffs' Addendum is completely inadequate and fails to include the record 
documents required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). Accordingly, the defendant Hospital 
attaches a separate Addendum with this response brief containing this Court's prior 
related opinion and the relevant rulings of the district court. 
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(R. 1336-45.) On appeal from that decision, this Court affirmed and reversed in part, 
remanding for trial to determine when the statute of limitations began to run as to Dr. 
Healy, and whether the statute was tolled as to McKay-Dee Hospital. See Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 335, 338 (Utah 1997) (Add. 1). That trial, limited to the 
statute of limitations defense, determined only that plaintiffs' current counsel did not have 
sufficient information to trigger the statute of limitations more than two years before the 
action was commenced. Plaintiffs did not attempt to prove that the statute of limitations 
was tolled as to the Hospital, based on supposed concealment by Dr. Healy. (R. 2423, 
2655, 2044, 2277-78.) 
A second jury trial, limited to plaintiffs' claim of medical negligence, was 
subsequently held over a three-week period. The jury returned a special verdict finding 
that neither defendant was negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell. (R. 4930-31.) The 
district court entered final judgment for defendants based on that verdict. (R. 4939-41.) 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from the final judgment. (R. 4966.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are the surviving mother, husband, and children of Shelly Hipwell, now 
deceased. (Third Amended Complaint, R. 277, 1fl[ 1-4.) 
A. Medical Summary. 
In 1988, Shelly was pregnant with her second child. Shelly's obstetrician was 
defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D., who practiced in Ogden, Utah. Dr. Healy had medical 
staff privileges at McKay-Dee Hospital ("Hospital"), which is owned by defendant IHC 
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Hospitals, Inc. Shelly's pregnancy was considered high risk because she smoked 
cigarettes and fetal growth was below normal rates. With complete bed rest and close 
monitoring throughout the pregnancy, Shelly reached thirty-six weeks of gestation, within 
two weeks of full term. At that point, Dr. Healy scheduled Shelly for induced delivery on 
December 13, 1988. {Id., ffi[ 5-6, 10; Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 368-80; Tr. 5006, Vol. IV, at 
915-18; Tr. 5007, Vol. V, at 1119-27; PL Exh. 20, pp. 17-33.) 
On the morning of December 12, 1988, Shelly went to the Hospital emergency 
room complaining of chest pain. She was examined by the emergency room physician, 
Dr. King, who ordered various tests, including an EKG, blood pressure, arterial blood 
gas, complete blood count, urinalysis, and urine culture. The test results were essentially 
normal, giving no indication of significant disease. Accordingly, Shelly was discharged 
with medication for pain and directions to follow-up with Dr. Healy the following 
morning. (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1375-79; Tr. 5006, Vol. IV, at 928-35; PL Exh. 20, pp. 
34-41.) 
On December 13, 1988, Shelly returned to the Hospital, where Dr. Healy delivered 
a healthy child by cesarean section. Shelly remained in the Hospital and was monitored 
and medicated throughout that evening. (Tr. 5007, Vol. V, at 1130-37; Tr. 5008, Vol. VI, 
at 1146-48; Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1379-81; Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 447-49; PI. Exh. 20, p. 
47.) 
On December 14, tests indicated a problem with Shelly's liver, and Dr. Healy 
immediately transferred her to the intensive care unit ("ICU"). The ICU physician, Dr. 
4 
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At the University Medical Center, Shelly's condition slowly improved. On 
December 28, she was transferred to the Medical Center's surgical ICU. On January 18, 
1989, a sternal bone marrow biopsy was performed on Shelly for the purpose of 
determining the cause of a sudden drop in her blood platelet count. During the course of 
this biopsy, the needle pierced through her sternum and punctured her heart, leaving a 
hole the size of a pencil. The pericardial sac around the heart filled with blood, creating 
pressure around the heart that prevented the heart from pumping. As a result, Shelly's 
brain was deprived of adequate oxygen for approximately sixteen minutes, leaving her 
with irreversible brain damage in a comatose state. Shelly never recovered from this 
trauma and died three years later, on May 27, 1992. (Tr. 5012, Vol. X, at 1983-2017, 
2033-49; Tr. 5007, Vol. V, at 951-81, 1040-46; Tr. 5013, Vol. XI, at 2274-89; PL Exh. 
20, p. 126; Third Amended Complaint, f 43.) 
B. Litigation Summary. 
After learning of Shelly's injury at the University Medical Center, Dr. Healy 
informed his brother, Tim Healy, an attorney, regarding a potential malpractice claim 
against the Medical Center. Tim Healy contacted attorney Roger Sharp regarding 
potential joint representation of Shelly and her family. Shane Hipwell entered into a 
retainer agreement with Roger Sharp on February 10, 1989. Plaintiffs in this case entered 
into an agreement with the University Medical Center on May 17, 1989, settling their 
medical malpractice claim for $250,000. (R. 108, 160, 211, 359, 702.) 
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On appeal, this Court affirmed and reversed in part. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). As to claims against Dr. Healy, this Court held that the 
allegations of fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations beyond attorney 
Sharp's investigation, and that the sufficiency of attorney Forgette's information to 
trigger the limitations period was a material issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. 
Id. at 333-35. As to claims against the Hospital, the Court held, on rehearing, that Dr. 
Healy's alleged cover-up tolled the statute of limitations only //plaintiffs alleged and 
proved on remand that Healy was acting as the Hospital's agent and to further the 
Hospital's interests. Id. at 338. In addition, this Court held that plaintiffs had raised no 
substantive fraud claim separate from their claim of fraudulent concealment. Id. at 336-
37. Finally, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the Hospital on the constructive 
fraud claim. Id. at 339-40. 
On remand, the district court ordered a separate trial on the statute of limitations 
issues. (R. 1493-96, Add. 24.) Prior to trial, the Hospital filed a motion for summary 
judgment demonstrating that Dr. Healy, in the alleged cover-up, did not act as the 
Hospital's agent or in furtherance of its interests so as to toll the limitations period on 
claims against the Hospital. (R. 1501.) The district court denied the motion, expressly 
reserving the issue for trial. (R. 1887-94, Add. 28.) However, the court thereafter 
approved a special verdict form proposed by plaintiffs, addressing only whether attorney 
Forgette acquired sufficient information to trigger the limitations period more than two 
years before the action was commenced. (R. 1978, 2013-15, Add. 36.) Plaintiffs did not 
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seek a jury determination on whether Dr. Healy's alleged cover-up could be imputed to 
the Hospital, as required to toll the limitations period invoked by the Hospital. In fact, 
plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of agency in the statute of 
limitations trial (R. 2044), and the district court granted that motion (R. 2277-78, Add. 
39), over the Hospital's opposition (R. 2169). 
Following a five-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that attorney 
Forgette did not reasonably discover the legal injury to Shelly Hipwell prior to December 
16, 1989, two years before notice of the action was filed. (R. 2423, Add. 42.) The 
Hospital, in objecting to the proposed order, again maintained that claims against the 
Hospital were barred because plaintiffs had failed to prove that Dr. Healy's alleged fraud 
tolled the limitations period on those claims. (R. 2435.) Without ruling on that objection, 
the district court denied defendants' motion for judgment NOV or new trial and set the 
matter for a negligence trial against both defendants. (R. 2465, 2655, Add. 43.) 
Prior to trial on the merits, plaintiffs moved to file a fourth amended complaint to 
"clarify" their fraud claim. (R. 2625.) Among other changes, plaintiffs sought to allege 
that Dr. Healy was acting as an agent of the Hospital in pursuing his alleged cover-up (R. 
2636-37,1f 33), the very issue that plaintiffs successfully excluded from the statute of 
limitations trial as "irrelevant" (R. 2052,2278). In response, defendants filed a motion to 
confirm dismissal of the fraud claim based on this Court's decision in Jensen, supra, at 
336-37. (R. 2665-75.) The district court agreed with defendants, rejecting the existence 
of an independent fraud claim. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment 
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claim pertained only to tolling of the statute of limitations and did not constitute a 
separate substantive claim. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss 
the fraud claim and denied plaintiffs' motion to amend the fraud claim. (R. 2750-58, 
Add. 48.) 
Having failed to convert their fraudulent concealment claim into a substantive 
fraud claim, plaintiffs next attempted to get their fraud evidence in by filing a pretrial 
motion to allow evidence of "admissions by conduct" on the part of Dr. Healy. 
Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prove Dr. Healy's negligence through evidence of his 
alleged cover-up. (R. 3666-67.) The Hospital joined Dr. Healy in opposing this motion 
because such evidence not only lacked probative value as to negligence, but would likely 
taint the Hospital by association, as well as confuse the jury as to the limited issue of 
negligence. (R. 3697-3700.) The district court initially ruled that plaintiffs could 
introduce evidence showing obstruction of justice. (R. 4567-68, Add. 56.) However, at 
trial, after hearing plaintiffs' proffer of cover-up evidence, the court found no nexus with 
Dr. Healy's medical care and excluded the evidence under Utah R. Evid. 403, ruling that 
the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and would also unfairly taint the 
Hospital. (Tr. 5008, Vol. VI, at 1226-59.) 
Finally, the Hospital filed a pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs' 
expert witness, Dr. Greg DeVore, concerning the standard of care governing emergency 
medicine specialists. The motion was based on the fact that Dr. DeVore is an obstetrician 
who lacks the experience, training, and qualifications to testify regarding the quality of 
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care provided by an emergency physician in the Hospital emergency room. (R. 3971-72, 
3980-4004.) The district court conditionally granted the motion, ruling that while Dr. 
DeVore could provide expert testimony on other facets of Shelly's care, he was not 
qualified to testify regarding her treatment in the emergency room. (R. 4568-69, Add. 
57.) 
C. Negligence Trial. 
At trial, the parties stipulated that "Shelly Hipwell died . . . as a result of 
complications from anoxic brain injury suffered on or about January 18, 1989, while a 
patient at the University of Utah Hospital." (R. 4682-83, Add. 59.) The parties agreed, 
and the jury was instructed, that "the University Hospital was negligent in its treatment of 
Shelly Hipwell and that such negligence was a cause of Shelly Hipwell's brain injury and 
death." (R. 4895.) The overriding issue at trial was whether negligence by defendants in 
this case was a contributing proximate cause of Shelly's subsequent brain injury and 
death. 
In essence, plaintiffs' case at trial focused on whether defendants were negligent in 
failing to deliver Shelly's baby one day sooner, in failing to diagnose HELLP Syndrome 
one day sooner, in failing to perform surgery on her liver a few hours sooner, and in 
transferring her to the University Medical Center, where her heart was punctured. 
Allegations against the Hospital were based on Dr. King's care in the emergency room on 
December 12, Dr. Baughman's care in the ICU on December 14, and Dr. Baughman's 
supposed participation in the transfer decision. Separate but related allegations were 
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directed toward Dr. Healy, who undisputedly acted as an independent contractor, relating 
to Shelly's delivery, care in the ICU, and the transfer decision. (Third Amended 
Complaint.) 
Plaintiffs produced one expert witness, Dr. DeVore, to address several different 
areas of medical expertise, including emergency medicine, as directed toward Shelly's 
care in the Hospital emergency room on December 12. Based on the district court's 
pretrial ruling, the Hospital objected at trial to Dr. DeVore's proposed expert testimony 
regarding alleged negligence in the Hospital emergency room, demonstrating through 
voir dire that he lacked the requisite education, training, experience, and certification to 
qualify as an expert in emergency medicine. The district court reaffirmed its prior ruling, 
excluding Dr. DeVore's testimony regarding the emergency room standard of care. (Tr. 
5004, Vol. II, at 381-88, 395-402, 456-61, Add. 61.) Because plaintiffs produced no 
other witness regarding the emergency room standard of care or the breach of that 
standard by the Hospital, the district court subsequently granted the Hospital's motion for 
partial directed verdict as to alleged negligence in the emergency room only. (Tr. 5011, 
Vol. IX, at 1788-92, 1798-1802, 1814-15, Add. 84; R. 4934-35, Add. 97.) The court 
subsequently issued a jury instruction consistent with that ruling. (Instruction No. 31, R. 
4904.) 
On the remaining issues, defendants produced overwhelming evidence that their 
care of Shelly Hipwell was well within the governing standards of care and had no effect 
on Shelly's subsequent injury at the University Medical Center. For example, Dr. 
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DeVore himself testified that Shelly died from the heart puncture, and that all other 
problems, including the liver rupture, had cleared up prior to her death. (Tr. 5005, Vol. 
Ill, at 646-47.) He conceded that Shelly would be alive today but for the heart puncture. 
(Tr. 5006, Vol. IV, at 728.) Defense expert Dr. James Martin, Professor and Chief of 
Obstetrics at the University of Mississippi Medical Center, testified that in one-third of 
the cases of HELLP Syndrome, symptoms do not manifest until after delivery. Only 1.5 
percent of patients with the disease develop bleeding into the liver, and only one in 
45,000 cases result in a ruptured liver. (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1359-65.) Dr. Joseph 
Civetta, Chairman of Surgery at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine and 
board certified in critical care, testified that Dr. Baughman's care was exemplary, 
including correctly diagnosing a very rare disease. Dr. Civetta opined that earlier liver 
surgery was not required and would not have changed the outcome, the liver rupture 
could not have been prevented, and transfer to the University Medical Center was 
appropriate. (Tr. 5010, Vol. VIII, at 1563-89.) Finally, Dr. Fred Millham, Associate 
Director of the Surgical Intensive Care Unit at the Boston Medical Center, testified that 
the sole cause of Shelly's brain damage was her heart puncture; no prior condition and 
nothing defendants did contributed to that injury. (Tr. 5013, Vol. XI, at 2286-89.) 
Based on all this evidence, the jury returned a special verdict finding no negligence 
by either Dr. Healy or the Hospital in their care of Shelly Hipwell. Accordingly, the jury 
did not reach the question of proximate causation. (R. 4930-31, Add. 100.) The district 
court entered judgment on the special verdict. (R. 4939, Add. 103.) Plaintiffs appeal 
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from that final judgment, as well as from the pretrial order denying their motion to amend 
and dismissing the fraud claims. (R. 4966-67.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' three fraud-related claims are directed toward the conduct of Dr. Healy. 
The district court's rulings on those claims were clearly within the court's sound 
discretion. However, those rulings may also be affirmed on the basis that the fraud-
related claims are rendered moot by the jury verdict of no underlying negligence. 
Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent concealment of negligence; therefore, a finding of negligence 
is a necessary predicate of the claim. Absent negligence, there can be no finding of 
concealment. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law, and their requested 
relief cannot be granted. 
Exclusion of Dr. DeVore's testimony regarding the emergency room standard of 
care was not an abuse of discretion because Dr. DeVore practices in a different medical 
specialty. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to make a foundational showing that Dr. DeVore is 
sufficiently knowledgeable about emergency room standards and procedures or that the 
standards of care for an emergency physician and an obstetrician are the same. In any 
event, plaintiffs failed to show that the emergency room physician was an agent of the 
Hospital, or that admission of the emergency room testimony would have likely resulted 
in a different verdict. 
Finally, as an alternative basis to affirm judgment for the Hospital, plaintiffs' 
claims against the Hospital remain barred by the two-year medical malpractice statute of 
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limitations. This Court previously ruled that Dr. Healy's alleged cover-up tolled the 
statute of limitations on claims against him. However, the Court ruled that the statute was 
not tolled as to claims against the Hospital unless plaintiffs proved on remand that Dr. 
Healy was acting as agent and for the benefit of the Hospital. Plaintiffs failed to prove 
those two points in the statute of limitations trial. Therefore, the statute of limitations was 
not tolled as to claims against the Hospital, and now those claims are barred. 
ARGUMENT 
This case, sustained for over ten years by groundless allegations of negligence and 
cover-up, is now fully exposed and finally played-out. Plaintiffs have had their "day in 
court," their trial on the merits, and the jury found no negligence by Dr. Healy or McKay-
Dee Hospital. Moreover, plaintiffs "concede that Dr. Healy and IHC presented sufficient 
evidence . . . to support this verdict." (App. Br. 25.) Accordingly, instead of challenging 
the jury verdict, plaintiffs contest four discretionary rulings of the district court on 
pleading and evidence. Plaintiffs' first three arguments all pertain to alleged cover-up by 
Dr. Healy. No such allegations are directed to the Hospital. The fourth argument pertains 
to exclusion of expert testimony regarding the Hospital emergency room. However, none 
of those four rulings was an abuse of discretion or affected the outcome of the trial. 
The Hospital acknowledges the tragic and unfortunate outcome of Shelly 
Hipwell's case. However, plaintiffs have already recovered for the negligence that 
caused her brain injury and death, and if that recovery was not enough, they have also 
recovered for the negligence or misconduct of their prior legal counsel in obtaining that 
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recovery. Plaintiffs' effort to obtain additional money from Dr. Healy and the Hospital 
for Shelly's same injury is unjust and has properly failed. 
In addition, as an alternative basis to affirm the judgment for the Hospital, all 
claims against the Hospital are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs failed to 
comply with this Court's mandate in Jensen to prove Dr. Healy's agency in order to toll 
the time for claims against the Hospital; therefore, those claims are barred. See, e.g., 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (this Court may affirm the district 
court judgment on any legal ground apparent in the record). 
POINT I: PLAINTIFFS5 THREE FRAUD-RELATED CLAIMS ARE RENDERED 
MOOT BY THE JURY VERDICT OF NO UNDERLYING 
NEGLIGENCE. 
Having failed to prove negligence, and conceding the evidentiary support for the 
verdict, plaintiffs necessarily strain to find other grounds for appeal. Plaintiffs now assert 
that fraudulent concealment, rather than negligence, is "the heart" of their case. (App. Br. 
at 4.) Plaintiffs' first three arguments on appeal all pertain to this supposed concealment 
claim, including (1) dismissal of the fraud claim, (2) amendment of the fraud claim, and 
(3) evidence of the fraud claim. The Third Amended Complaint directs this fraudulent 
concealment claim only against Dr. Healy. (Third Amended Complaint, Second Cause of 
Action.) Plaintiffs make no allegation that the Hospital participated in or knew of this 
supposed cover-up, and plaintiffs exclude the Hospital from their defined group of 
"Conspirators." (Third Amended Complaint, f 33.) Accordingly, the Hospital defers to 
Dr. Healy to respond in full to these first three arguments and joins in his response brief 
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on those points. Here, the Hospital merely offers a brief response to the fraud arguments 
collectively, to the extent they may affect the Hospital indirectly.2 
For ten years or more now, plaintiffs have kept this case alive with allegations 
of fraudulent concealment of negligence. The implication was that defendants had done 
something terrible to Shelly Hipwell and then covered it up to prevent discovery of their 
negligence. Thus, fraudulent concealment was not asserted as a separate substantive 
claim, or as a distinct basis for damages, but only as justification to toll the statute of 
limitations on the'negligence claim. However, after prevailing in the statute of limitations 
trial, plaintiffs then sought to amend their complaint, not to "clarify" the fraudulent 
concealment claim, as they now deceptively assert (R. 2625), but to convert it into a 
separate substantive claim. That attempt was weak because the proposed amended 
complaint contained no separate allegations of fraudulent conduct and no claim of 
2
 Regarding the motion to amend, plaintiffs argue that they are merely complying with 
this Court's mandate in Jensen to allege and prove agency so as to impute liability for Dr. 
Healy's fraudulent conduct to the Hospital. (App. Br. 35.) This is a blatant distortion of 
Jensen. First, this Court discussed agency and possible imputation of Dr. Healy's 
conduct to the Hospital only for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations based on 
fraudulent concealment. 944 P.2d at 338. Nowhere does the Court suggest, or authorize 
a determination, that Dr. Healy is the Hospital's agent for purposes of liability, and 
contrary to plaintiffs' assertion (App. Br. 35, n.3), no such interpretation is "obvious." 
Plaintiffs had every opportunity to litigate this agency issue in the statute of limitations 
trial, but purposely chose not to (R. 2044); therefore, plaintiffs have waived that argument 
and cannot now be heard to complain that they were denied the chance to prove agency. 
Second, as this Court acknowledged in Jensen, and as demonstrated in Dr. Healy's 
response brief, plaintiffs have alleged no substantive fraud claim; therefore, no 
amendment of the complaint is necessary to impute liability for that claim to the Hospital. 
Accordingly, the proposed amendment was properly denied on the basis that it would 
have contravened the law of the case, as established in Jensen. See Nelson v. Elway, 971 
P.2d 245, 248-49 (Colo. App. 1998). 
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damages resulting from fraudulent conduct. Plaintiffs' motion to amend prompted 
defendants to file a motion to confirm that no separate fraud claim had been raised, as this 
Court held in Jensen, supra, at 336-37. (R. 2665-75.)3 The district court agreed, denying 
the motion to amend and granting the defense motion. (R. 2753-58.) 
The district court ruling that plaintiffs had asserted no separate fraud claim 
prompted plaintiffs to seek introduction of their fraud evidence by some other means, 
filing a motion to introduce the concealment evidence as proof of negligence. (R. 3666-
67.) However, the district court properly excluded such evidence at trial, as any slight 
probative value on the issue of negligence was easily outweighed by danger of confusion 
and unfair prejudice to both Dr. Healy and the Hospital, which was admittedly innocent 
of any involvement in the alleged cover-up. See Utah R. Evid. 403. 
While the district court rulings on these three fraud-related motions were plainly 
within the court's sound discretion and did not likely affect the outcome, they may be 
affirmed on the additional basis that the fraudulent concealment claim is now moot. 
What plaintiffs allege was concealed is negligence, and now that the jury has found no 
negligence, there can be no further claim of concealment. In short, it is now established 
that nothing was actually concealed; therefore, it would serve no purpose now to amend 
the complaint to augment the concealment claim, or to reinstate the concealment claim, or 
3
 Cases from other jurisdictions support this Court's holding in Jensen that no separate 
claim for fraud exists when it is based only on concealment of underlying medical 
malpractice. See, e.g., Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 764-65 (Kan. 1996); Rizkv. 
Cohen, 535 N.E.2d 282, 286 (N.Y. 1989) 
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to put on evidence of concealment. Because plaintiffs' requested relief on the three 
motions would thus have no practical effect, the arguments are moot. See, e.g., 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990) (statute of 
limitations defense rendered moot by court decision holding the statute invalid); Badger 
v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 25 (Utah App. 1995) (claim moot because requested judicial 
relief could not affect the rights of the parties). 
Case law illustrates the futility and inconsistency of proceeding with a fraudulent 
concealment claim after the underlying negligence claim is resolved. For example, in 
Wurzberg v. Lapid, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12799 (D.N.Y. 1993), the plaintiffs alleged 
medical malpractice in failing to remove a cancerous ovary and fraudulent concealment in 
failing to disclose the negligence. Based on its finding of no negligence, the court 
concluded that plaintiffs could assert no separate claim of fraudulent concealment: 
[Maintenance of a fraud action against a physician for concealing sub-
standard medical treatment necessarily involves a finding of malpractice. 
Accordingly, the crux of plaintiffs' claims turns on whether [defendant] was 
negligent.... 
Without a finding of negligence in the first instance,.. . plaintiffs lack 
the requisite predicate for their fraudulent concealment claim. Only if 
plaintiff can demonstrate that the operation was negligently performed must 
the court reach the question of whether a subsequent failure to disclose this 
negligence gives rise either to an independent action for fraud or to a toll to 
the statute of limitations. [Id. at *10.] 
Similarly, in Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 161 (Jan. 19, 2000), a 
medical malpractice action, the court held that fraudulent concealment is a "derivative 
claim" that depends on the viability of the underlying claim. If the plaintiff fails to prove 
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the underlying claim, the "derivative claim for fraudulent concealment... must also fail." 
M a t * 15. 
In summary, plaintiffs' three fraud-related arguments have no further viability in 
view of the jury finding of no negligence. Absent negligence, there could be no 
negligence cover-up; therefore, granting plaintiffs relief on their claims related to 
pleading and proof of cover-up would be futile. Plaintiffs now lack the essential 
predicate for their fraudulent concealment claim. Wurzberg, supra. Accordingly, the 
district court rulings should be affirmed. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE EMERGENCY 
ROOM STANDARD OF CARE BASED ON THE EXPERT'S 
LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS. 
Having lost on all other claims of negligence, plaintiffs now exaggerate the 
claimed negligence in the Hospital emergency room, asserting in their fourth argument 
that exclusion of their expert's testimony regarding the emergency room standard of care 
altered the outcome of their case. (App. Br. 47-49.) However, the law and facts show no 
abuse of discretion. 
A, Legal Principles Governing Expert Medical Witnesses. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 provides that if "specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." The party offering the expert witness has the burden of 
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establishing sufficient foundation to show the witness' qualifications and expertise. E.g., 
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248-49 (Utah 1985); Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 
339 (Utah App. 1987). The trial court then has the duty and discretion to determine 
whether the witness is adequately qualified and whether the expert testimony should be 
admitted. E.g., Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22,26 (Utah 1999) (trial judge is the 
"gatekeeper"); Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Utah App. 1993). As this Court 
observed in Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Utah 1991): 
"The trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this court will not reverse." 
(Emp. added.) In reviewing a district court's exclusion of expert testimony at trial, this 
Court gives deference to the district court's "advantageous position; thus, that court's 
rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned 'unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error.'" Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996) (emp. 
added; citation omitted). Plaintiffs have shown no abuse of discretion. 
In cases alleging medical malpractice against a physician, the plaintiff must 
establish (1) the standard of care by which the physician's conduct is measured, (2) 
breach of that standard (negligence), and (3) proximate causation of the claimed injury by 
that negligence. E.g., Chadwickv. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 1988). In 
cases, such as the present, in which vicarious liability is alleged against a hospital for the 
negligence of a physician practicing in the hospital, the plaintiff must also establish that 
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the physician is the agent of the hospital, because hospitals do not practice medicine. 
E.g., Tolman v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1986). 
Because of the technical and specialized nature of medical care, "expert medical 
testimony must be presented at trial in order to establish the standard of care." Chadwick, 
supra, at 821. Moreover, "it is sound public policy to limit expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases to that which is within the doctor's specific field of practice." Id. at 
822. As this Court held in the leading case of Burton v. Youngblood, supra: 
It is true that, ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is not 
competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a 
practitioner of another school. In light of the wide variation between 
schools in both precepts and practices, as a general matter this rule makes 
good sense. It has been judicially adopted in a majority of states, and we 
follow it here. [711 P.2d at 248.] 
See also Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993) ("Practitioners in one 
specialty are not ordinarily competent to testify as experts on the standard of care 
applicable in another specialty.55). Accordingly, an electrical engineer with expertise in 
fluid mechanics is not qualified to give expert testimony regarding venous blood 
transportation. Chadwick, supra, at 822. Neither is an ocular plastic surgeon qualified to 
testify against a general plastic surgeon who performed eyelid surgery. Burton, supra, at 
249. 
This Court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule. An expert in one 
medical specialty may testify regarding the standard of care in another specialty when the 
expert is sufficiently "knowledgeable about the standard of care of another specialty or 
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when the standards of different specialties on the issue in a particular case are the same." 
Arnold v. Curtis, supra, at 1310. However, the proposed expert's foundational testimony 
must reliably establish that the expert meets one of these exceptions. For example, in 
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947-48 (Utah App. 1994), relied upon by plaintiffs here, 
the court held that an emergency room specialist could not testify concerning the standard 
of care of a cardiologist because the witness "failed to establish . . . that he had sufficient 
knowledge regarding the appropriate standard of care prior to his review of the 
documents," or "that the standard of care for emergency room physicians is the same as 
for cardiologists." Similarly, in Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991), 
the court upheld exclusion of expert testimony by a general practitioner against a 
pediatrician because of inadequate foundation showing the expert's knowledge of the 
alleged negligent course of action. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy either exception. 
B. Dr. DeVore Fails to Qualify As An Emergency Room Expert. 
Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. DeVore, is an obstetrician/gynecologist who 
specializes in ultrasound examination of the fetus (perinatologist). He is admittedly not 
an emergency room physician. Therefore, under the foregoing principles, Dr. DeVore is 
not competent to testify regarding the emergency room standard of care, or the care 
rendered by the emergency room physician, Dr. King, without a foundational showing 
that he is sufficiently knowledgeable about the emergency room standard of care, or that 
the standard of care for an obstetrician and an emergency room physician are the same. 
See Burton and Arnold, supra. Plaintiffs have made no such showing. 
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The Hospital initially challenged Dr. DeVore's qualifications to testify as an expert 
witness nearly three years before the negligence trial. (R. 1697-1702.) The Hospital 
moved to exclude Dr. DeVore's emergency room testimony in a motion in limine filed 
March 9, 2001 (R. 3971), three weeks prior to trial. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion 
(App. Br. 43), the district court did not deny this motion. While the court found Dr. 
DeVore qualified to testify regarding other aspects of the case, the court conditionally 
granted the motion as to the emergency room: 
With specific regard, however, to testimony addressing Ms. Hipwell's 
emergency room care, the Court finds Drs. DeVore and Schifirin are not 
qualified to testify regarding her treatment during triage stages, specifically, 
prior to her being diagnosed as needing obstetric care. Accordingly, 
forgoing any new information regarding these doctors' qualifications, their 
testimony will be limited in this manner. [R. 4558-69, emp. added.] 
Accordingly, plaintiffs are disingenuous when they argue now that they were surprised by 
the exclusion of Dr. DeVore's testimony at trial and lost credibility by asserting 
emergency room negligence in their opening statement. (App. Br. 7, 50.) Knowing that 
Dr. DeVore's qualifications to testify as an expert would be challenged at trial, plaintiffs 
had ample opportunity to retain a qualified expert, but either decided against it, or were 
unable find one. 
At trial, when plaintiffs attempted to elicit Dr. DeVore's testimony regarding 
knowledge of emergency room records, the Hospital appropriately objected and engaged 
the witness in voir dire concerning his lack of emergency room experience and 
qualifications. Dr. DeVore testified that emergency medicine is a board certified 
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specialty; that he is not board certified in emergency medicine; that he has never sat for 
the American College of Emergency Physicians ("ACEP") board certification, is not 
qualified to seek such certification, and lacks sufficient training for emergency medicine 
board certification; that the ACEP guidelines are different from the American College of 
Gynecologists ("ACOG") guidelines; that he has never applied for privileges to work as 
an emergency room physician; that he subscribes to no literature and takes no course in 
emergency medicine; that his only article related to an emergency room was more than 
ten years ago; and that his only work in an emergency room was as a resident at Yale, 
more than 20 years ago, when the specialty of emergency room physician did not yet 
exist* Dr. DeVore also conceded that he has no knowledge concerning guidelines for 
liver function tests at the McKay-Dee emergency room, and that he had reviewed no 
literature involving emergency room standard of care. Based on this testimony, the 
district court sustained the objection. (Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 381-88.) 
4
 Dr. DeVore testified: 
Q When you worked in an emergency room, I think you told us back 
at Yale, did the emergency department have a full blown emergency staff 
much like LDS Hospital or Cottonwood or the University would have? 
A The emergency room staff was-they did not have emergency 
room physicians as we do today. 
Q All right. So when you were working as a resident some 20 years 
ago in emergency departments, since that time how emergency departments 
are staffed, how they function, how they are trained is totally different, 
correct? 
A Yes. [Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 385.] 
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When plaintiffs subsequently attempted to elicit Dr. DeVore's opinion on how Dr. 
King should have responded to the information he obtained in the emergency room, the 
Hospital again objected, and the district court sustained the objection: "[I]f he says it has 
to be the emergency room physician who acts on it, that opinion is not going to be 
allowed. Because in my opinion he has a lack of foundation on the emergency room." 
(Id, at 399.) Dr. DeVore then testified regarding what is contained in the emergency 
room and other Hospital records, and he was allowed to offer his opinion regarding 
negligence in other aspects of Shelly's care. However, when he attempted to testify 
regarding the emergency room standard of care, the district court again sustained the 
Hospital's objection. (Mat 461.) 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Dr. DeVore is sufficiently knowledgeable 
about the emergency room standard of care to provide an expert opinion as to what 
constitutes the applicable standard. Dr. DeVore testified that he has never worked in a 
modern emergency room, and that his only experience is seeing his own patients come 
through the emergency room. If that remote observation alone qualified him as an expert 
on emergency medicine, any physician with patients who come through an emergency 
room would qualify as an expert, contrary to this Court's rule in Burton and Arnold, 
supra. "The mere fact that [a physician] has worked with . . . emergency room physicians 
in the past does not by itself qualify him to render an expert opinion as to the standards of 
care applicable to physicians who practice medicine in th[is] specialized field[]." 
McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1052 (Ohio App. 1997). Dr. DeVore's 
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emergency room experience many years ago is insufficient to qualify him as an 
emergency medicine expert today. See Franklin v. Public Health Trust, 759 So. 2d 703, 
705 (Fla. App. 2000) (general surgeon who formerly directed an emergency department 
was properly excluded from testifying against an emergency room physician because he 
"lacked substantial experience providing emergency medical services in a hospital 
emergency department within the last five years")- Accordingly, the district court is not 
obligated to accept Dr. DeVore's mere assertion that he knows the emergency room 
standard of care when other compelling evidence calls that assertion into serious question. 
Such a course "invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with unreliable testimony." 
Dikeou, supra, at 947. 
Neither is Dr. DeVore in a position to know whether the emergency room standard 
of care is the same as that for an obstetrician, like himself. The essence of plaintiffs' 
negligence claim against Dr. King, the emergency room physician, is that he should have 
diagnosed Shelly's rare condition and notified Dr. Healy so that her baby could have been 
delivered one day sooner. (App. Br. 46-49.) However, Dr. DeVore conceded that ACEP 
and ACOG guidelines are different, and that he is unfamiliar with the testing standards 
and procedures in a modem emergency room. (Tr. 5004, Vol. II, at 383-86.) Moreover, 
Dr. DeVore testified that, given the information available to the emergency room, he 
would have delivered the baby. (Id. 422-23.) However, an emergency room physician is 
not trained or expected to deliver babies; at most, his duty is to arrange for delivery by a 
trained obstetrician, as indicated by test results and other circumstances. Thus, plaintiffs' 
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allegation toward Dr. King is not that he should have delivered the baby, but that he 
should have notified Dr. Healy to deliver the baby. Therefore, the standards of care for 
an emergency room physician and an obstetrician are plainly not the same, and Dr. 
DeVore lacks the familiarity with emergency room testing, procedures, and standards to 
opine whether Dr. King met those standards in this case. 
In any event, plaintiffs have failed to show that admission of Dr. DeVore's 
emergency room testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. The evidence 
showed that Dr. King conducted extensive testing and found no indication of significant 
disease; moreover, he did direct Shelly to follow up with her obstetrician, which she did 
the very next morning. In addition, expert testimony at trial was compelling and credible 
that Shelly's delivery was timely, and that delivery one day sooner would not have 
affected Shelly's outcome. (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1374-81.) Additionally, given the fact 
that the jury was not convinced by Dr. DeVore's testimony on other matters, there is no 
substantial likelihood that the jury would have changed its verdict had he been permitted 
to add his opinion regarding emergency room negligence. Accordingly, even if plaintiffs 
could establish a "clear abuse of discretion," Rees, supra, they could not show that "the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict." Anton v. Thomas, supra, at 746; see Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros,, 20 
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968) (evidentiary ruling is not cause for reversal unless 
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it had substantial bearing on the outcome of the trial). Therefore, the ruling should be 
affirmed.5 
Finally, as an alternative basis to affirm the district court's exclusion of Dr. 
DeVore's testimony, plaintiffs failed to proffer any evidence that Dr. King is an agent of 
the Hospital, an essential element of proof to establish Hospital liability. See Tolman v. 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., supra; Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Absent any proffer of Dr. King's 
agency, evidence of his negligence still would have resulted in a verdict of no liability 
against the Hospital. Accordingly, plaintiffs are precluded from asserting on appeal that 
the exclusion of evidence regarding emergency room negligence was improper or that 
admission of the evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. See, e.g., 
Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980) (proffer must include the 
agency relationship of person allegedly acting for the defendant); Downey State Bank v. 
Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978) (absent required proffer, 
appellant is precluded from asserting the alleged error on appeal). See also Arnold v. 
Curtis, supra, at 1310 (affirming exclusion of expert medical testimony, challenged-for 
lack of qualifications, on alternative basis that plaintiff failed to show proximate 
causation). 
5
 Dr. DeVore's credibility was weakened, not only by his lack of experience and expertise on 
the medical issues, as noted by the other experts (Tr. 5009, Vol. VII, at 1496; Tr. 5010, Vol. 
VIII, at 1572-79), but by his involuntary termination from IHC in 1990, which resulted in 
litigation with IHC and a substantial judgment and collection proceedings against him (Tr. 5006, 
Vol. IV, at 742-49). See DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1994). Based on 
these past differences, the jury could easily have assumed Dr. DeVore's testimony was slanted 
by personal bias. 
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In summary, the district court's exclusion of Dr. DeVore's testimony concerning 
the emergency room standard of care was proper, did not constitute a clear abuse of 
discretion, and was not prejudicial on the record taken as a whole. 
POINT III: THIS ACTION IS TIME-BARRED AS TO THE HOSPITAL 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THAT DR. 
HEALY'S ALLEGED COVER-UP SHOULD BE IMPUTED TO 
THE HOSPITAL. 
In plaintiffs' prior appeal to this Court, as set forth in Jensen v IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
supra, the primary issue was whether plaintiffs' action was barred by the two-year statute 
of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1). In moving for summary judgment, defendants had 
demonstrated without dispute that attorney Sharp, representing plaintiffs, knew of and 
investigated possible negligence claims against Dr. Healy and the Hospital at least by 
April of 1989. (R. 538, 549-50.) Because plaintiffs thus knew of their claim against 
defendants more than two years before they filed their notice of intent on December 16, 
1991, their action was barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 558-64.) The district court 
granted summary judgment on that basis. (R. 1336-39.) On appeal, this Court 
acknowledged that plaintiffs' "claims are barred by the statute of limitations, unless . . . 
the statute was tolled for some reason." 944 P.2d at 332-33. The court then addressed 
plaintiffs' allegations of fraudulent concealment by Dr. Healy and held that the 
limitations period was necessarily tolled beyond Sharp's investigation to the investigation 
by plaintiffs' substitute counsel, Forgette. Id. at 333-34. The issue prescribed for trial on 
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remand was thus whether Forgette knew of a possible claim against defendants prior to 
December 1989, more than two years before filing the notice of intent. Id. at 335. 
Prior to remand, however, the Hospital filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that 
the statute of limitations was not tolled as to claims against the Hospital because there 
was no allegation or proof of Hospital involvement in the alleged cover-up. Id. at 337-38. 
The Hospital cited Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Utah 
1989), to show that summary judgment should be affirmed for medical providers, like the 
Hospital here, not involved in alleged fraudulent concealment. This Court acknowledged 
that the issue "whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee . . . [was] not discussed in our initial opinion." Jensen, 
supra, at 338. The Court also agreed that generally fraud by one defendant in concealing 
a cause of action will not toll the statute as to another defendant. Id. 
Citing an exception to that rule, the Court explained that Dr. Healy's fraudulent 
concealment could be imputed to the Hospital only based on "two factual findings: (i) that 
Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent; and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted . . . to further the aims of 
McKay-Dee." Id. at 338. Even though "[t]he complaint makes no allegations regarding 
these issues," id, the Court remanded to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to establish those 
two facts. The Court instructed that if Dr. Healy is found to have acted as the Hospital's 
agent and in furtherance of the Hospital's interests, then the statute of limitations is tolled 
as to claims against the Hospital, and those claims are not barred. However, absent such 
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findings, "then Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee 
and [plaintiffs'] claims against McKay-Dee are barred." Id. (emp. added). 
The effect of Jensen, then, was to remand one issue for determination of Dr. 
Healy's statute of limitations defense, based on what attorney Forgette knew, id. at 335, 
and a second, different issue for determination of the Hospital's statute of limitations 
defense, based on whether Dr. Healy was the Hospital's agent in the alleged cover-up, id. 
at 338. 
On remand, the Hospital moved for summary judgment on the agency/benefit 
issue, demonstrating that Dr. Healy was not its agent and that Healy's actions did not 
further the Hospital's interests. (R. 1501-11.) See, e.g., Tolmany. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
supra (physician with hospital staff privileges is not an agent of the hospital). Plaintiffs 
opposed the motion, arguing that the agency issue must be reserved for the jury in the 
statute of limitations trial. (R. 1566, 1578.) The district court denied the Hospital's 
motion, expressly reserving the agency issue for trial. (R. 1887, 1893-94.) 
However, the Hospital's agency issue was neyer tried in the statute of limitations 
trial. Realizing they could not prove Healy's agency, plaintiffs embarked instead on a 
strategy to lump both defendants into the same statute of limitations analysis, and thereby 
keep the Hospital in the case without proof of agency. First, plaintiffs proposed a special 
verdict form, which the district court approved, addressing only Forgette's knowledge, 
without reference to the agency issue. (R. 1978-85,2013-15.) Second, plaintiffs filed a 
motion in limine to exclude the issue of agency from the statute of limitations trial on the 
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grounds that it was not relevant. (R. 2044-52.) The Hospital opposed that motion, 
demonstrating that plaintiffs were attempting to escape their burden of proof on the 
agency issue. (R. 2169-76.) However, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion, 
excluding the issue of agency and limiting the focus of the statute of limitations trial to 
the single question of what attorney Forgette knew, the question that disposed only of Dr. 
Healy's limitations defense. (R. 2277-78.) The jury returned that limited verdict for 
plaintiffs. (R.2423.)6 
Following the statute of limitations verdict, plaintiffs proposed a judgment that 
purported to be a final adjudication of the statute of limitations defense as to both 
defendants. (R. 2433-34.) The Hospital objected to the proposed judgment, asserting 
again its right to dismissal in the absence of proof of Dr. Healy's agency (R. 2435-40); 
however, the district court denied relief and set the matter for trial against both 
defendants. Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to establish Dr. Healy's agency, as this Court 
directed was necessary to toll the time for claims against the Hospital. 
Plaintiffs' course violated this Court's mandate in Jensen. A decision by this 
Court establishes the law of the case as to all issues decided and is thereafter binding on 
the parties and the lower court in all subsequent proceedings. See, e.g., Thurston v. Box 
Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). "This serves the dual purpose of 
6
 As shown below, the Hospital had no burden of proof on the statute of limitations issues on 
remand. Dr. Healy proposed a special verdict question on Forgette's knowledge, and the 
Hospital joined in that proposal, expecting plaintiffs to propose a special verdict question on the 
agency issue. (R. 1916.) However, plaintiffs successfully evaded the issue. 
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protecting against the reargument of settled issues and of assuring adherence of lower 
courts to the decisions of higher courts." Id. at 1038. This Court's decision is conclusive 
and controlling on the issues decided and may not be disregarded or subsequently 
challenged, even if considered to be in error. Id. at 1038-39. See also Klinger v. Kightly, 
889 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah App. 1995) (prior decision of supreme court on discovery rule 
in statute of limitations case "is controlling as the law of this case"). Accordingly, this 
Court's legal conclusion in Jensen that plaintiffs' "claims against McKay-Dee are barred" 
absent proof of Dr. Healy's agency, id. at 338, is binding on the parties and the district 
court in all subsequent proceedings. That unconditional conclusion established the 
Hospital's prima facie statute of limitations defense, including the undisputed facts on 
which it was based, and contemplated no additional proof or determination other than 
whether Dr. Healy's cover-up should be imputed to the Hospital. 
The burden of proving that Dr. Healy acted as agent and for the benefit of the 
Hospital is on the plaintiffs. The plain language of Jensen, stated in the affirmative rather 
than the negative, makes clear that the burden of proof is on plaintiffs: It requires proof 
"that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent" and "acted . . . to further the aims of McKay-
Dee," not that he was not an agent or did not act to benefit the Hospital. In Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996), this Court held that once the defendant has 
established the statute of limitations bar, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to avoid that bar 
"by making a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that 
given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim 
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earlier." 914 P.2d at 51. This language was cited in Jensen, supra, at 336. Berenda 
added that "when the facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are . . . 
insufficiently established... the claim fails as a matter of law." 914 P.2d at 54 (emp. 
added). See also McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting 
fraudulent concealment claim as a matter of law because the plaintiff produced "no 
evidence connecting [the defendant physician] with any concealment"). 
Accordingly, on remand, in order to toll the limitations period on claims against 
the Hospital based on Dr. Healy's cover-up, plaintiffs were obligated to prove Dr. Healy's 
agency and the benefit to the Hospital. However, plaintiffs failed in this burden of proof. 
They affirmatively chose to avoid this burden by limiting the scope of the special verdict 
and by filing a motion in limine to exclude the issue of agency. By choosing not to 
address the agency issue in the statute of limitations trial, plaintiffs waived the issue and 
cannot now assert it to defeat the Hospital's statutory bar. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996) (claim not argued in the district 
court is "waived"). The result is that plaintiffs have produced "no evidence connecting" 
the Hospital with Dr. Healy's alleged concealment. See McDougal, supra, at 179. 
Therefore, the claim of fraudulent concealment against the Hospital is "insufficiently 
established [and] fails as a matter of law." Berenda, supra, at 54. 
In support of their motion in limine to exclude the issue of agency, plaintiffs cited 
the case of Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, 976 P.2d 1202, construing it to preclude 
consideration of fraudulent concealment prior to expiration of the four-year statute of 
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repose. Plaintiffs asserted that because fraudulent concealment was no longer relevant to 
the statute of limitations, neither was agency. (R. 2045.) However, plaintiffs read the 
case too broadly. In Day, the plaintiff filed a foreign-object claim just over one year after 
discovery. The narrow issue was which limitations period applied, the general two-year 
provision for all malpractice claims, or the one-year exception for discovery of foreign 
objects. This Court held that the general two-year provision applied and that the one-year 
foreign-object exception applied only to claims brought after the four-year repose period. 
Id. f 22. Thus, Day is distinguishable because it construes the statutory one-year 
exceptions in 78-14-4(1), while Jensen applies common law principles of fraudulent 
concealment to toll the general two-year provision. Jensen, supra, at 336. As framed by 
Jensen, neither statute of limitations issue required proof of fraudulent concealment on 
remand, regardless of Day. Moreover, Day says nothing to change plaintiffs' burden of 
proof on the separate issue of agency. 
In summary, plaintiffs have waived their opportunity on remand to prove that Dr. 
Healy acted as the Hospital's agent to toll the statute of limitations on claims against the 
Hospital Therefore, the assertion of fraudulent concealment to toll claims against the 
Hospital fails as a matter of law. Because "Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee [plaintiffs'] claims against McKay-Dee are barred." Jensen, 
supra, at 338. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the judgment of the district court 
as to defendant McKay-Dee Hospital. 
Respectfully submitted this / / "^dav of March, 2002. 
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JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS, INC. 
Cite as 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) 
Utah 327 
Sherry JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell, indi-
vidually and on behalf of all other heirs 
of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele 
Hipwell and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell 
appearing by Shayne Hipwell as guard-
ian ad litem, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-Dee 
Hospital, and Michael J. Healy, M.D. 
and Does I through X, Defendants, Ap-
pellees, and Cross-Appellant 
No. 950164. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 4, 1997. 
Opinion Granting Rehearing 
Aug. 22, 1997. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1997. 
Patient's family sued physician and 'hos-
pital for wrongful death arising out of medi-
cal malpractice. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Division I, * Glenn Iwasaki, J., 
granted summary judgment for defendants 
on limitations grounds. Family appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J.., held 
that: (1) wrongful death claims were, gov-
erned by two-year statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice actions; (2> limitations 
penod began running when plaintiffs discov-
ered, or should have discovered, underlying 
injury; (3) genuine issue of fact as to wheth-
er physician's fraudulent concealment tolled 
statute of limitations precluded summary 
judgment; (4) patient's children were not 
entitled to bring wrongful death claim such 
that they were not entitled to provisions of 
tolling statute, on motion for rehearing; (5) 
genuine issues of fact existed as to whether 
physician's alleged fraudulent concealment 
could be impute to hospital so as to toll 
limitations period on claim against hospital; 
and (6) family did not present evidence to 
support constructive fraud claim against hos-
pital, and thus such a claim could not toll 
limitations penod 
1. Statutes 5=^188, 223.2(.5), 223.4 
When faced with two statutes that pur-
port to cover same subject, Supreme Court 
determines legislature's intent as to which 
statute applies by following general rules of 
statutory construction, which provide^ both 
that best evidence of legislative intent is 
plain language of statute and that more spe-
cific statute governs instead of more general 
statute. 
2. Physicians and Surgeons ^18.15 
Two-year statute of limitations govern-
ing medical malpractice actions covered ac-
tion by patient's family for wrongful death 
ansmg out of medical malpractice. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-14-4. 
3. Death <s=>39 
Statute of limitations applicable "to 
wrongful death claims ansmg out of medical 
malpractice begin to run at time patient or 
plaintiff discovers or, through use of reason-
able diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever first occurs. U.C.A.1953, 
78-14-4. 
4. Death e=>39 
Absent any reason to toll two-year stat-
ute of limitations governing deceased pa-
tient's medical malpractice claims, patient's 
family could not bring survival claim, where 
statute had run by time patient died. U.CA 
1953, 78-11-12, 78-12-37, 78-14-4. 
5. Judgment <3>181(7) 
Genuine issue of fact as to whether phy-
sician's alleged fraudulent concealment pre-
vented patient's family from mquinng into 
possibility of medical malpractice on part of 
physician and hospital precluded summary 
judgment in favor of physician and hospital 
on statute of limitations grounds m family's 
wrongful death action ansmg out of medical 
malpractice. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
6. Death €=39 
Deceased patient's minor children were 
not entitled to bring action for wrongful 
death because patient had appointed guard-
Af f r m nnvrr v»n 
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from running on children's' claims1* against 
physician and hospital for wrongful death 
arising out of medical malpractice. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-11-7, 78-12-36, 78-14-4. 
7. Fraud e=>38 
Patient's family's claim of fraudulent 
concealment of medical malpractice was gov-
erned by two-year medical malpractice stat-
ute of limitations, even though complaint al-
leged common-law fraud; common-law fraud 
allegations surrounded fraudulent conceal-
ment claim that physician acted to divert 
family's attention away from "his alleged mal-
practice. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
8. Limitation of Actions @=>104(1) 
"Fraudulent concealment doctrine"" is 
mechanism whereby plaintiff can avoid full 
operation of discovery rule by making prima 
facie shoeing of fraudulent concealment and 
then demonstrating that given defendant's 
actions, reasonable plaintiff,would not have 
discovered claim earlier. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
On Petition for Rehearing 
9. Limitation of Actions @=>104(1) 
Generally, fraud committed by thirdf par-
ty in concealing a cause of action against 
another defendant will- not toll statute of 
limitations as to that defendant; however, 
where there is agency or privity relationship 
between third party committing fraud and 
defendant, liability for third party's fraud can 
be imputed to defendant if third party acts 
whole or in part to carry out purposes of 
defendant,. 
10. Judgment <^181(7) 
Genuine issues of fact as to whether 
physician was hospital's agent and whether 
physician acted in whole or in part to further 
aims of hospital when he allegedly colluded 
with attorneys to conceal medical malpractice 
action precluded summary judgment action 
fnv Wmfal on staiute of limitations grounds 
11. Fraud ®=>7,16 
Constructive fraud requires confidential 
relationship between parties and failure^ to 
disclose material facts. 
12. Limitation of Actions ^197(2) 
Patient's family failed to present evi-
dence to support constructive fraud claim 
against hospital, based on claim that a hospi-
tal physician failed to disclose that he had 
committed medical malpractice in treating 
patient, and thus constructive fraud could not 
be used to toll statute of limitations on fami-
ly's medical malpractice claims against hospi-
tal, where family did not present evidence to 
contradict physician's deposition testimony 
that patient received exemplary care. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-14-4. 
Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell, 
Gary R. Johnson, Salt Lake City, and Simon 
H. Forgette, Kirkland, WA, for plaintiffs. 
James W. Gilson, Kathy A. Lavitt, Salt 
Lake City, for IHC. 
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg, 
Salt Lake City, for Dr. Healy. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
The trial court granted summary judgment 
for defendants IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), and 
Michael J. Healy, M.D. ("Dr. Healy"), ruling 
that plaintiffs Sherry Jensen and Shayne 
Hipwell's action was barred by the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations, section 78-
14-4 of the Utah Code. Jensen and Hipwe!l 
appealed the grant of summary judgment 
under section 78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code. 
We reverse and remand to the trial court for 
resolution of a fact question relevant to the 
tolling of the statute of limitations. 
A detailed recitation of the facts is neces-
sary to understand the complex legal issues 
presented by this appeal. " 'Before we recite 
the facts, we note that in reviewing a grart 
of summary judgment, we view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom m 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party'" K & T, Inc v Koroulis 888 P.2d 
Utah 329 JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS, INC. 
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Because _McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy moved to represent Shelly in a medical malpractice 
for summary judgment, we state the facts in 
the light most favorable to. Jensen and Hip-
well 
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell are, 
respectively, the surviving mother and hus-
band of Shelly Hipwell. They seek to recov-
er for Shelly's wrongful death on behalf of 
themselves and as legal guardians of Shelly's 
two minor daughters (collectively "Shelly's 
family"). On December 12, 1988, the' day 
before a scheduled induced delivery of her 
second daughter, Shelly experienced severe' 
abdominal pain and went to the emergency 
room of McKay-Dee Hospital. After being 
sent home, Shelly returned to McKay-Dee 
on December 13th for a caesarian delivery of 
her baby. Shelly experienced various com-
plications at McKay-Dee after the delivery, 
Which Shelly's family claims were the result 
of malpractice and negligence on the part of 
McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy, Shelly's obstetri-
cian. Ofi December 23rd, Shelly was trans-
ferred to the University of Utah Hospital for 
further treatment. At University Hospital, 
Shelly suffered anoxic brain damage after a 
Resident physician punctured her heart with 
3. biopsy needle, leaving her in a coma, totally 
and permanently disabled. Shelly subse-
quently died some three and a half years 
later, on May 27, 1992. 
In early 1989, while Shelly was at Univer-
sity Hospital in a coma, Dr. Healy discussed 
case. Three days later, attorney Healy 
wrote to attorney Sharp, confirming a fee-
splitting arrangement Shelly's family was 
not aware of attorney Healy's involvement in 
the case or of Diane DeVries' relationship 
with Dr. Healy and attorney Healy. The 
letter from attorney Healy to attorney Sharp 
makes clear that attorney Healy was commu-
nicating with Dr. Healy about attorney 
'Sharp's investigation and implies that attor-
ney Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy's 
treatment was to be minimal. 
As part of his investigation, attorney Sharp 
sent a document request to Dr. Healy, seek-
ing "a copy of all medical records regarding 
[Shelly] Hipwell." Dr. Healy did not pro-
duce a copy of all medical records, but in-
stead produced a selective set of documents 
that he personally reviewed. Attorney 
Sharp never received a copy of Shelly's com-
plete medical records from Dr. Healy. By 
letter, attorney Sharp also requested a copy" 
of Shelly's complete medical records from 
McKay-Dee Hospital. However, he subse-
quently orally limited that request and ulti-
mately received only limited medical records 
from McKay-Dee. On May 6,1989, attorney 
Shaj-p and Shelly's family settled her case 
against University Hospital for $250,000, the 
amount of the previously effective statutory 
cap on damages against the University.1 
In mid-1989, Shelly was transferred from 
Shelly's case with his brother, attorney Tim McKay-Dee Hospital, to which she had re-
Healy. After this discussion, attorney Healy 
had discussions with the Healys' sister, Di-
ane DeVries. In the course of those discus-
sions, attorney Healy asked DeVries to call 
Shelly's family and recommend attorney 
Roger Sharp, a Salt Lake attorney who spe-
cialized in medical malpractice cases. DeV-
ries had known Shelly's family for some time, 
turned from University Hospital on April 14, 
1989, to the Greenery, a rehabilitation facility 
in Washington State. Carol Pederson, a so-
cial worker at the Greenery, contacted attor-
ney Simon Forgette on August 10, 1989, to 
request that he provide an opinion of the 
settlement in Shelly's case and evaluate the 
conduct of her attorneys in settling the case. 
DeVries contacted Shelly's family but did not At that time, Forgette's memos to the file 
tell them that the Healys were her brothers, regaining the possible new case indicate that 
nor did she tell them that she was also Dr. Forgette understood that Shelly's liver had 
Healy's file clerk. Shelly's family retained been lacerated during her caesarian delivery 
attorney Roger Sharp on February 10, 1989, at McKay-Dee. On August 29th, Forgette 
!• This court struck down the statutory cap on 
medical malpractice damages as unconstitutional 
on* May 1, 1989, in Condemann v University 
Hospital 775 P2d 34S (Utah 1989), approxi*-
h " 1 7 i t p l v flV£> rl-aVC k « f / - \ T O C V i d l U r ' r foTV^'U* ~ ~ ~ J - . -
ty- Attorney Sharp knew of our decision in 
Condemann when the settlement was agreed to, 
and his actions in that case have been the subject 
of litigation See Hipwell v. Shaip, 858 P.2d 987 
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contacted Pederson, who assured him that 
she had the family's permission to discuss 
Shelly's case. , She identified Sharp as Shel-
ly's Utah attorney. That same day, Peder-
son wrote a letter to Forgette in which she 
stated, "Ms. Jensen [Shelly's mother] has 
requested you to offer an opinion on the 
settlement reached in this case, and advise 
the family regarding any further legal action 
which might be indicated." On September 
18th, Forgette reviewed medical records pro-
vided by Pederson and asked that she ar-
range for a meeting with Ms. Jensen, Shel-
ly's mother. His understanding at that time 
was still that Shelly's liver had been lacerat-
ed at McKay-Dee. Forgette's memo to his' 
file also indicates that he needed to deter-
mine "the statute of limitations on bringing 
any claim against hospitals or against attor-
neys." 
On October 19, 1989, Ms. Jensen, Shelly's 
mother, traveled to Washington and met with 
Forgette to discuss Shelly's case. Ms. Jen-
sen orally retained Forgette on .this date and 
Forgette was to request a copy of attorney 
Sharp's file. Forgette's memo to the file at 
this time indicates that he was working with 
a Utah attorney who was doing some, back-
ground investigations regarding Shelly's case 
and the settlement with University Hospital 
This attorney wanted to "remain in the back-
ground" because he had worked with attor-
ney Sharp in the past and received a signifi-
2. Section 78-14-8 of the Utah Code provides that 
a medical malpractice action may not commence 
"unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospec-
tive defendant . . at least ninety days' prior 
-notice of intent to commence an action " If the 
filing of the notice of intent comes Itss than 90 
days before the end of the limitations period for 
filing a medical malpractice action, the limita-
tion period "shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice." Id. Further, 
within 60 days of filing a notice of intent, the 
plaintiff must submit a request for prelitigation 
panel review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
12(l)(c)(2)(a). But see Gramhch v. Munsey, 838 
P.2d 1131 (Utah 1992) (holding that action may 
not be dismissed for failure to file request for 
prelitigation review within 60 days of notice of 
intent). That section also provides that upon 
filing a request for prelitigation review, the stat-
ute of limitations is tolled until 60 days after the 
prelitigation panel issues its opinion. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-12(3) 
We note that Shelly's family filed its notice of 
cant amount^ of business/ from McKay-Dee. 
The memo to the file also indicates that, after 
meeting with Shelly's mother, Forgette's un-
derstanding was that Shelly's liver "had been 
either damaged or had burst" while she was 
at McKay-Dee. On October 20th, Forgette 
wrote to Sharp requesting a copy of his file 
on Shelly. By December 14th, Ms. Jensen 
still had not signed a formal retainer and 
Forgette had still not received Sharp's file. 
On that date, Forgette drafted a retainer 
agreement to send to Ms. Jensen, which pro-
vided that Forgette was to handle claims 
against McKay-Dee Hospital, University 
Hospital, Roger Sharp, attorney Healy 
and/or others. On December 26th, Forgette 
received a portion of Sharp's file, but he did 
not receive the entire file until February 15, 
1990. In the meantime, the present plain-
tiffs, Ms. Jensen and Shayne Hipwell (Shel-
ly's husband), signed Forgette's written re-
tainer agreement on January 17,1990. 
"When Forgette received Sharp's file on 
February 15th, he learned of attorney Hea-
ly's involvement in the case and learned that 
Sharp's file did' not contain a complete set of 
medical records from Dr. Healy or McKay-
Dee Hospital. Forgette did not file a notice 
of intent to commence suit in the instant case 
against McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy 
until almost two years later, on December 16, 
1991.2 Shelly Hipwell died on May 27, 1992, 
lawsuit until July 29, 1992, more than 120 days-, 
after filing the notice of intent. Both parties 
before this court briefed the issues as if Decem-
ber 16, 1989, the date two years before the filing 
of the notice of intent, was the relevant date for 
statute of limitations purposes. We can only 
assume that Shelly's family's failure to file its 
lawsuit within 120 days of that date was due to 
their having filed a request for prelitigation re-
view and waiting for the panel's decision. How-
ever, we find no indication of this in the record. 
If Shelly's family did not file a prelitigation re-
view request, the filing of the lawsuit more than 
120 days after the filing of the notice of intent 
may be fatal to the entire suit. See Milieu v. 
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980) 
(holding that where notice of intent was filed less 
than 90 days before running of limitations period 
and lawsuit was not filed within 120 days of 
filing notice of intent, suit was properly dis-
missed). We do not address this issue because it 
was not presented to us. 
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and Forgette filed the complaint in this suit allowed to proceed on their separate claims 
for common law fraud, which are governed 
by a three-year statute of limitations. -We 
on July 29,1992 
After allowing the parties to complete dis-
covery, the trial court granted summary 
judgment to Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee on 
February 21, 1995, ruling that the two-year 
statute of limitations governing medical mal-
practice actions contained in section 78-14-4 
of the Utah Code had run by December of 
1991, when Forgette filed his notice of intent. 
On appeal, Shelly's family makes a series of 
arguments, which are summarized below. 
First, Shelly's family contends that the 
wrongful death statute of limitations, section 
78-12-28(2) of the Code, applies to their 
wrongful death claims. They argue that 
their claims cannot be barred until two years 
after Shelly's death because the wrongful 
death statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until the decedent's death. In the alterr 
native, they argue that if the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations contained in 
section 78-14-4 of the Code applies in case$ 
of wrongful death due to medical malpractice, 
the two-year period it contains should, not 
begin to run until the decedent's death. We 
reject both these claims. 
Second, Shelly's family asserts that the 
running of the statute of limitations .on^  both 
Shelly's personal urjury claims (which sur-
vived her death and are now asserted by her 
family) and their wrongful death, claims 
should be tolled because of Dr.
 s Healy's al-
leged fraudulent concealment of the facts 
upon which their claims are grounded. The 
trial court ruled that Shelly's family's oral 
retention of attorney Forgette on October 19, 
1989, more than two years before the filing of 
the notice of intent, "demonstrated that For-
gette was in possession of facts whereby he 
knew or should have known that [Shelly] 
Hipwell's condition was caused or possibly 
caused by negligence on the part of McKay-
Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy." We conclude 
that this is a disputed issue of fact -that' 
precludes summary judgment. 
Third, Shelly's family argues that Shelly 
Hipwell's minor children should be allowed to 
proceed with claims for wrongful death be-
cause the children's minority tolled the stat-
ute of limitations « tn thpir rlsimQ T act 
reject both claims. 
Returning in. depth to Shelly's family's 
first argument concerning the statute of limi-
tations that applies to their wrongful death* 
claims: Shelly's family reasons that because 
this is a claim for wrongful death, section 78-
12-28(2) of the Code, which governs wrongful 
death, is the applicable statute of limitations," 
rather than the Medical Malpractice Act stat-
ute of limitations contained in section 78-14-
4, as the trial court held. Shelly's family 
further argues that the two-year limit in the 
wrongful death statute does not begin to run 
until the decedent's death. 
[1] When we are faced with two statutes 
that purport to cover the same subject, we 
seek to determine the legislature's intent as 
to which applies. In doing this, we follow the 
general rules of statutory construction, which 
provide both that "the best evidence of legis-
lative intent is the plain language of the 
statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 
P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that "'a more 
specific statute governs instead of a more 
general statute.' " De Baritault v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 
1142, 1145 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted)). 
In this case, the Medical Malpractice Act's 
plain language indicates a legislative intent to 
have the statute apply to claims such as the 
ones Shelly's family seeks to bring. 
[2] The Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act specifically provides, "No malpractice ac-
tion . . . may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers . . . the injury.". Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Act defines "mal-
practice actions" to which the Act was in-
tended to apply as "any action against a 
health care provider, whether in contract, 
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal inju-
ries relating to or arising out of health care 
•v-nnrfciYx- /• r , V A „ 1 J 
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§ 78-14-3(14) (emphasis added). Clearly, 
the legislature intended that the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act apply to actions for 
wrongful death based upon personal injuries 
arising out of medical malpractice. Further, 
this statute is more specific than the general 
wrongful death statute of limitations, apply-
ing as it does only to wrongful death actions 
arising out of medical malpractice. There-
fore, we hold that the two-year statute of 
limitations governing medical malpractice ac-
tions covers this action for wrongful death 
arising out of medical malpractice. 
Shelly's family next argues that if the med-
ical malpractice statute of limitations governs 
their claims for wrongful death, the event 
that begins the running of the statute is the 
decedent's death. The medical malpractice 
statute of limitations provides that a medical 
malpractice action must be brought "within 
two years after the plaintiff or patient discov-
ers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered the injury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (emphasis add-
ed). Shelly's family argues that the "injury" 
in a wrongful death case arising1 out of medi-
cal malpractice is not the malpractice itself 
but is, rather, the death. They argue that 
because there can be no cause of action for 
wrongful death until death occurs, the stat-
ute of limitations on their claims cannot be-
gin to run until Shelly's death. 
We have held that an action for wrongful' 
death is an independent action accruing in 
the heirs of the deceased, Van Wagoner v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189,186 P.2d 293, 
303 (1947). This is conceptually compatible 
with Shelly's family's assertion of a right to 
proceed independent of any analysis of Shel-
ly's predeath rights against her physicians. 
However, we have not entirely separated the 
heirs' right from the decedent's because the 
heirs' right is in major part based on rights 
of support, both financial and emotional, that 
run to them from the deceased. According-
ly, we have held that the wrongful death 
cause of action is based on the underlying 
wrong done to the decedent and may only 
proceed subject to at least some of the de-
fenses that would have been available against 
County, 784 P.2d, 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989) 
(comparative negligence). The question here 
is whether we should separate the death 
from the causative wrong sufficiently to per-
mit a wrongful death action where the dece-
dent's personal injury cause of action had 
been barred at the time of d$ath.
 f We de-
cline to adopt such a rule. 
[3,4] As one of the foremost authorities 
on the law of torts has observed, the ratio-
nale underlying the rule barring the heirs 
from bringing a wrongful death suit after the 
injured patient has brought suit on the un-
derlying personal injury action is that "the 
injured individual is not merely a conduit for 
the support of others, he is master of his own 
claim and he may settle the case or win or 
lose a judgment on his own injury even 
though others may be dependent upon him." 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed. 
1984). The majority of states refuses to 
allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a 
wrongful death suit after the decedent has 
settled Ms or her personal injury case or won 
or lost a judgment before dying. Id. Given 
the underlying rationale, and 'given that the 
core purpose of any statute of limitations is' 
to compel exercise of a right within a reason-
able time to avoid stale claims,' loss of evi-
dence, and faded memories, Horton v. Gold-
miner's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 
1989), we see no reason to impose a different 
rule regarding the'heirs' maintenance of a 
wrongful death suit where ari injured patient 
has chosen to let the statute of limitations 
run on the underlying personal injury claim 
rather than settling or litigating the claim. 
Therefore, we hold that in wrongful death 
claims arising out of medical malpractice, the 
applicable statute of limitations is section 78-
14-4 of the Code, and the statute^ begins to 
run at the time the "patient discovers or, 
through the use ,of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever 
first occurs," meaning the time the patient 
discovers or should have discovered the med-
ical malpractice injury. Thus, Shelly's fami-
n e wrongful death claims are barred by the 
Cite as 944 P.2d 
below, the statute was tolled for some rea-
son.3 
Notwithstanding the two-year statute of 
limitations governing their claims, Shelly's 
family argues that they are entitled to main-
tain these actions because the statute of limi-
tations was tolled by Dr. Healy and attorney 
Healy's fraud sufficiently long that attorney 
Forgette's notice of intent was timely. Dis-
position of this claim requires a rather in-
depth discussion of the complex law of fraud-
ulent concealment. 
Fraudulent concealment requires that one 
with a legal duty or obligation to communi-
cate certain facts remain silent or otherwise 
act to conceal material facts known to him. 
37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968). 
Such a duty or obligation may arise from a 
relationship of trust between the parties, an 
inequality of knowledge or power between 
the parties, or other attendant circumstances 
indicating reliance. Id The party's silence 
must amount to fraud, i.e., silence under the 
circumstances must amount to an affirmation 
that a state of things exists which does not 
exist, and ' the • uninformed party must be 
deprived to the same extent as if a positive 
assertion had been made. Id Such "[con-
cealment or nondisclosure becomes fraudu-
lent only when there is an existing fact or 
condition . . . which the party charged is 
under a duty to disclose." Id Making use 
of a device that misleads, some trick or con-
trivance that is intended to exclude suspicion 
and prevent inquiry, may also amount to 
3. Shelly's family also argues that they are enti-
tled to proceed with Shelly's personal inju-
ry/medical malpractice claims as her personal 
representatives and/or heirs under the survival 
statutes. The survival statutes provide that a 
deceased person's personal injury action does 
not abate when that person dies, but rather sur-
vives the person's death and may be brought by 
the deceased's personal representatives or heirs. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. However, if 
the person has not brought suit before her death, 
her personal representatives or heirs may bring 
suit only if the person died before the time al-
lowed for bringing suit had expired, and then 
they must bring suit within one year of the per-
son's death. See id § 78-12-37. 
Absent any reason to toll the statute, the two-
year statute of limitations governing Shelly Hip-
well's medical malpractice/personal injury 
claims, section 7S-14—4, had run by the time she 
327 (Utah 1997) 
fraudulent concealment. Id It is this as-
pect of fraudulent concealment that is at 
issue in the instant case. 
Applying the facts of Shelly's case to these 
requirements, Shelly's
 < family's argument 
must run as follows: (i) Dr. Healy was in a 
position of superior knowledge and was the 
beneficiary of Shelly's and her family's trust; 
(ii) this superior knowledge and position of 
trust created a duty to disclose material facts 
regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy knew 
of his brother's involvement with attorney 
Sharp and knew of the cursory nature of 
attorney Sharp's investigation but did not 
disclose these facts to Shelly's family or, 
alternatively, concealed them from Shelly's 
family to divert attention from his alleged 
malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that Shel-
ly's family would rely on attorney Sharp's 
investigation to uncover any malpractice on 
his part, thus creating a duty on his part to, 
disclose the facts of his association with at-f 
torneys Healy and Sharp; (v) in this manner, 
Dr. Healy used his position of influence with 
his brother and attorney Sharp to divert 
Shelly's family's attention away from his care 
of Shelly, thereby preventing them from'dis-
covering the facts constituting the alleged 
malpractice. 
Once this argument is reduced to its basic 
elements, it is clear that attorney Sharp's 
investigation cannot be used to start the 
statute of limitations running against Shelly's 
claims.4 What is not as clear is whether Dr. 
allowed for doing so had expired, her personal 
injur}' cause of action did not survive her death, 
and thus her family cannot bring a survival 
claim. 
4. Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee argue that attorney 
Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy and McKay-
Dee Hospital in early 1989 triggered the statute 
of limitations as to medical malpractice claims 
against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. We decline 
to follow this logic on the facts as they are 
presented to us. While under general principles 
of agency law, the knowledge of an agent is to be 
imputed to the principal, it is well established 
that, where the agent has interests in the transac-' 
tion adverse to the principal's, or where the 
agent colludes with third parries whose interests 
are adverse to the principal's interests, knowl-
edge of the facts at issue will not be imputed to 
the principal. See 3 Am Jur.2d Agency § 290 
(1986) In the instant case, attorney Sharp's fee-
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Healy's alleged fraudulent concealment was 
sufficient to continue tolling the statute of 
limitations once Shelly's family retained at-
torney Forgette in the fall of 1989. As noted 
above, Shelly's family contends that they had 
no facts that could have led them to suspect 
malpractice by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee 
until February of 1990, when they discovered 
the relationships among Dr. Healy, attorney 
Healy, Diane DeVries, and attorney Sharp. 
In contrast, Dr. Healy contends that attorney 
Forgette considered Dr. Healy and McKay-
Dee as potential defendants in a medical 
malpractice suit on Shelly Hipwell's behalf as 
early as December 14, 1989, as evidenced by 
his retainer agreement prepared on that 
date, which included references to Dr. Healy 
and McKay-Dee. Shelly's family presented 
attorney Forgette's affidavit as evidence that 
he included Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in his 
retainer agreement with Shelly's family 
merely to "cover all the bases" but was re-
tained solely to investigate legal malpractice 
on the part of attorney Sharp in* settling 
Shelly's claims against University Hospital 
for her punctured heart. 
The'trial court made what amounts to a 
mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law on 
disputed evidence, to * wit, that Forgette's' 
"oral retention of October 19, 1989 clearly 
demonstrated that Forgette was in posses-
sion of facts whereby he knew or should have 
known that [Shelly] Hipwell's condition was 
caused or possibly caused by negligence on 
the part of McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. 
Healy." (Emphasis added.) This finding 
and conclusion is inappropriate on a motion 
for summary judgment. "Summary judg-
ment is appropriate only when no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." K & T, Inc., 888 P.2d at 626-27 (citing 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins, 855 P.2d at 
235). " We determine . . . whether the trial 
court . . . correctly held that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact.' " Id. (quot-
ing Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151.(Utah 
1989);. Here, the trial court erred. 
implication in attorney Healy's letter to attorney 
Sharp that Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy's 
care of Shelly was to be minimal indicate that 
1 !_,.+
 r i ^ r , r , c r i n r n n . 
The error committed here directly paral-
lels that made by the trial court in Berenda 
v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996). In 
Berenda, we specifically stated: 
The application of this legal rule [of fraud-
ulent concealment] to any particular set of 
facts is necessarily a matter left to trial 
courts and finders of fact [W]e ex-
plicitly acknowledge that weighing the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in 
light of the defendant's steps to conceal 
the cause of action necessitates the type of 
factual findings which preclude summary 
judgment in all but the clearest of cases. 
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate 
only when the facts fall on two opposite 
ends of a factual continuum: either (i) 
when the facts are so clear that reasonable 
persons could not disagree about the un-
derlying facts or about the application of 
the governing legal standard to the facts 
or (ii) when the facts underlying the allega-
tion of fraudulent concealment are so tenu-
ous, vague, or insufficiently established 
that they fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to concealment, with the 
result that the claim fails as a matter of 
law. 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54. In that case,, we 
held that the plaintiffs letters to his part-
ner/defendant reflecting the plaintiffs suspi-
cion that the partner was misappropriating 
partnership assets were insufficient to under-
lie a trial court finding that the plaintiff was 
under a duty to make inquiries, which would 
have led to discovery of the cause of action. 
Id. We found that the letter equally sup-
ported the plaintiffs contention that he 
voiced his suspicions in the letters in an 
attempt to find out if the company "was 
really broke." Id. We said that "while it 
may be 'a close call,' . . . we cannot agree 
that, as a matter of law, the two letters 
demonstrate that [plaintiff] should have sus-
pected [defendant's] wrongdoing or, more im-
portantly, that an inquiry would reasonably 
verse to Shelly Hipwell's. Therefore, his investi-
gation of Dr. Healy and his consideration of Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee as potential defendants m 
a malpractice action cannot be used to start the 
' * - " • „ * * • ^ * . J l - i < J , J L i 1 V « 
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have led to discovery of the misapplica-
tion." Id. at 55. 
[5] The issue before the trier of fact in 
this case is whether attorney Forgette dis-
covered or reasonably should have discover-
ed the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell 
before December 16, 1989. In other words, 
the jury must determine whether the facts in 
this case indicate that Dr. Healy's fraudulent 
concealment somehow prevented Shelly's 
family, who, by retaining attorney Forgette, 
had defeated the collusion of Dr. Healy with 
his brother and attorney Sharp, from inquir-
ing into the possibility of medical malpractice 
on the part of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
The question becomes: Would a reasonable 
attorney, presented with the facts that attor-
ney Forgette knew in December of 1989,-
have considered investigating a medical mal-' 
practice case against Dr. Healy and McKay-
Dee? This is a genuine issue of material 
fact, which precludes summary judgment in 
this case. Therefore, we remand to the trial 
court on this issue, the outcome of which' will 
determine'whether Shelly's family is entitled' 
to proceed on both their survival claims and* 
their wrongful death claims. 
Shelly's family's next argument is that 
even though the statute of limitations bars 
the adult plaintiffs, Shelly's children were, 
minors at the time of her injury and death 
and, therefore, section 78-12-36, the tolling, 
statute, came into play and prevented the 
statute of limitations from running on their 
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
[6] This argument fails because the chil-' 
dren's situation does not fit within the tolling 
statute's terms. Section 78-12-36 provides, 
"If a person entitled to bring an action . . . is 
at the time the cause of action accrued, [i] 
either under the age of minority or mentally 
incompetent and [ii] without a legal guardian, 
the time of the disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the 
action." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (brack-
eted material added). Shelly's children were 
not entitled to bring an action for wrongful 
death because Shelly had an appointed 
5. A separate question we do not address is 
whether the tolling statute would have applied to 
guardian at the time of her death.5 The 
wrongful death statute provides: 
When the death of a person not a minor is 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his heirs, or his personal repre-
sentatives for the benefit of his heirs, may 
maintain an action for damages against the 
person causing the death , If such 
adult person has a guardian at the time of 
his deat)\ only one action can be'main-
tained for the injury to or'death of such 
person, and such action may be brought by 
either the personal representatives of such 
adult deceased person, for the benefit of 
his heirs, or by such guardian for the 
benefit of the heirs 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (emphasis add-
ed). The statute thus clearly provides that if 
a guardian has been appointed, only the per-
sonal representative or guardian may bring 
suit and the heirs are no longer entitled to 
maintain an action. • In this case, Shayne* 
Hipwell and Sherry Jensen were appointed 
as Shelly's guardians. Under the statute's, 
plain language, Shelly's children were not 
entitled to bring an action for her wrongful 
death, and the tolling statute becomes irrele-
vant as the children had no claims. 
1
 [7] As a final argument,' Shelly's family 
seeks to avoid the two-year medical malprac-
tice statute of limitations by bringing their 
claim within the three-year fraud statute of 
limitations. * During the pendency of the liti-
gation below, Shelly's family amended their 
complaint to allege common law fraud. - Shel-
ly's family argues that the statute of limita-
tions for fraud, section 78-12-26(3), governs 
these fraud claims, giving them three years 
from the time they discovered the facts con-
stituting the fraud in which to bring their 
action. The trial court ruled that section 78-
14~4(l)(b), the two-year medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, governed Shelly's fami-
ly's claims for fraud. Alternatively, the court 
held that if the ihree-year statute'applies,' 
Shelly's family had established sufficient is-
sues of material fact to withstand summary 
judgment on their fraud claims. Shelly's 
family seeks reversal of the first prong of 
though the statute of limitations'had run on 
Shell's underlying persona] injur}' claims b) the 
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this holding, and Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee care rendered or which should have been 
seek reversal of the second. We uphold the rendered by the health care provider."' 
trial court's ruling that the medical malprac- Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14). Thus, the 
tice statute of limitations governs Shelly's medical malpractice act's two-year statute 9f 
family's fraud claims, and we need not reach limitations applies to cases of fraudulent con-
the second ruling. cealment arising out of medical malpractice. 
[8] As stated above, when faced with two in contrast, the three-year fraud statute of 
statutes that purport to cover the same sub- limitations, section 78-12-26, applies to any 
ject, our primary duty "is to determine legis- action "for relief on the ground of fraud." 
lative intent, and the best evidence of legis-
 T h e fraud s t a t u t e of limitations is thus far 
lative intent is the plain language of the broader than the medical malpractice act, 
statute." Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. A set-
 a n d o u r m]es of s ta tutory construction pro-
tied rule of statutory construction, which ^de
 t h a t t h e m o r e s p e c i f l c m e d i c a ] m a l p r a c . 
helps us determine legislative intent, pro-
 t i c e a c t a p p l i e s i n s t e a d of t h e m o r e g e n e r a l 
vides that "a more specific statute governs
 fraud s t a t u t e of limitations. 
instead of a more general statute." De Bar-
itault, 913 P.2d at 748 (citation omitted). Shelly s family argues that it has made a 
The medical malpractice * statute of limita- general fraud claim and a constructive fraud 
tions provides a two-year limit on -bringing c l a i m in addition to, and distinct from, their 
medical malpractice actions. The statute in- clai™s of fraudulent concealment discussed 
eludes a 'discovery rule, providing that the a b o ye. . -However, we can find nothing in 
two-year limitations period does not begin to t h e i r allegation of fraud or constructive fraud 
run until the "patient discovers, or through t hat is in any way different from their claims 
the use of reasonable diligence should have of fraudulent concealment. All the allega-
discovered the injury, whichever ..first, oc-, tions raised by Shelly's family surround their 
curs." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1).*. .In claim that Dr.,Healy acted,to divert,the 
Utah, the discovery rule includes the judi- family's attention away from his alleged mal-
cially created doctrine of fraudulent conceal- practice when he had a duty to disclose the 
ment. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at .51. .The facts of his relationship with attorneys Healy 
fraudulent,concealment doctrine/is a mecha- and Sharp. The only damages arising out of 
nism whereby a plaintiff "can avoid the full, Shelly's family's claims for fraud and con-j 
operation of the discovery rule by making a" structive fraud relate to the possibility that 
prima facie showing of fraudulent conceal- they were prevented from discovering the-
ment and then demonstrating that given'the facts constituting their claim for medical mal-
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff practice. While we acknowledge that there' 
would not have discovered the claim earlier." may be cases where a doctor commits fraud 
Id. The medical malpractice statute of limi-' on a patient in a way that would not be 
tations, with its discovery rule- and that covered by the medical malpractice act's 
rule's fraudulent concealment doctrine, ap- fraudulent concealment provision, this is not 
plies to every "malpractice action against a such a case. Given the specific facts alleged 
health care provider." As noted above, the in this case, we cannot agree that Shelly's 
statute defines "malpractice action against a family's fraud claim amounts to anything 
health care provider" to include actions for more than or is different from a claim of 
wrongful death "based upon alleged personal fraudulent concealment of medical malprac-
injuries relating to or arising out of health tice.6 See Gillman v. Department of Fin. 
6. Shelly's family claims that this reading of the 
statutes would violate their nght to uniform op-
eration of laws under article I, section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution They argue that, read as out-
lined above, the medical malpractice statute cre-
ates two classes of people, those defrauded by 
health care providers and those defrauded by 
others and provides a shorter statute of hmita-
decline to address this issue as it is inadequately 
researched and briefed. See Walker v. U.S. Gen., 
Inc, 916 P.2d 903, 90S (Utah 1996); Butler, 
Crocket: & Walsh Dev Corp v Pineciest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 234 (Utah 1995); 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,, 966 (Utah 
1989), Giaco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc v 
h onwood Exvloi ahon, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079 
JENSEN v. IHC 
Cite as 944 P.2d 
Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) 
(rejecting attempts to recast claim for dam-
ages arising out of regulators' licensing deci-
sion as claim for negligence to avoid govern-
mental immunity). 
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's fami-
ly's wrongful death claims are governed by 
the two-year statute of limitations for medi-
cal malpractice actions contained in section 
78-14-4 of the Utah Code. We further con-
clude that the limitations period starts run-
ning when the patient or plaintiff discovers, 
or through the exercise of due diligence 
should have discovered, the underlying injury 
and its origins in medical malpractice. We 
remand this case for a factual finding as to 
whether Shelly's family's claims of fraudulent 
concealment will toll the statute of limitations 
as to their wrongful death and survival 
claims. We hold that the deceased's children 
were not entitled to bring a wrongful death 
claim because their mother had a guardian 
appointed at the time of her death and thus 
the children were not entitled to the provi-
sions of the tolling statute. Finally, we hold 
that Shelly's family's claims for common law 
fraud are also governed by the two-year 
medical malpractice 'statute of limitations 
found in section 78-14-4 and decline to reach 
their claims of the unconstitutionality of this 
reading of the statute. 
RUSSON, HOWE, EVES, and 
HALLIDAY, JJ., concur in Chief Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
Having disqualified themselves, Associate 
Chief Justice STEWART and Justice 
DURHAM do not participate herein; District 
Judge J. PHILLIP EVES and District 
Judge BRUCE K. HALLIDAY sat. 
On Petition for Rehearing 
This court now grants rehearing and issues 
this opinion without hearing oral argument. 
(Utah 1988); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984) 
As we recently noted in Monson v Carver, we 
may refuse to address a claim of unconstitution-
ality where the party making the claim has failed 
to make*the requisite showing to support the 
claim 928 P 2d 10] 7, 1024 (Utah 1996) '"[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues 
HOSPITALS, INC. Utah 337 
327 (Utah 1997) 
We address whether we'should uphold sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant 
McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee") be-
cause plaintiffs Shayne Hipwell and Sherry 
Jensen's wrongful death action against 
McKay-Dee was barred by the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4. In our prior opinion 
in this case, we reversed the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment as to all defen-
dants and remanded on the issue of whether 
defendant Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy") 
alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs' 
original attorney was sufficient to toll the 
statute of limitations on their medical mal-
practice claims once they had retained an 
independent' attorney. Jensen v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337 (1997). We 
further held that Jensen and HipweU's at-
tempt to recharacterize their medical mal-
practice wrongful death claim as a claim for 
fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-'1 
year medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions. Id. at 337. In its petition 'for rehear-
ing, McKay-Dee now claims that'summary 
judgment in its favor should have 'been up-
held because (i) Dr. Healy's fraud does not 
toll the statute of limitations as to Jensen 
and HipweU's claims against McKay-Dee; 
and (ii) Jensen and HipweU's allegations of 
fraud on the part of McKay-Dee were prop-
erly dismissed by the trial court. 
We begin with a brief review of the facts 
relevant to our decision on rehearing. Be-
cause we are reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving parties, Jensen 
and Hipwell. Id. at 328. Jensen and Hip-
well allege that Dr. Healy, who had staff 
privileges at McKay-Dee but was not em-
ployed by McKay-Dee, committed malprac-
tice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's daughter 
and HipweU's wife) while she was a patient at 
party may dump the burden of argument and 
research. ' " Id. (quoting Butler, 909 P.2d at 
230-31) (additional citations omitted) In this 
case, as in Monson, we are particularly loath to 
address a claim of unconstitutionality of a statute 
where the outcome would "critically depend on 
factual research" into the effectiveness of these 
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McKay-Dee. They claim that, to cover his 
alleged malpractice, he and a McKay-Dee 
doctor fraudulently transferred Shelly to 
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell 
further allege that Dr. Healy then colluded 
with his brother, attorney Tim Healy, and 
attorney Roger Sharp to prevent Jensen and 
Hipwell from learning of the malpractice Dr. 
Healy had allegedly committed. Jensen and 
Hipwell made no allegation that McKay-Dee 
knew about Dr. Healy's collusion with his 
brother and attorney Sharp. 
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen 
and Hipwell's allegations of fraud against Dr. 
Healy were sufficient to toll the statute of 
limitations on their claims as long as they 
retained attorney Sharp. Id. at 336. How-
ever, we remanded to the trial court on the 
issue of whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud 
was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations 
after Jensen and Hipwell retained indepen-
dent counsel but before that counsel had 
actual knowledge of the facts constituting Dr. 
Healy's alleged fraud. Id. at 336-337. The 
issues we.now address are (i) whether Dr. 
Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the 
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee; and 
(ii) whether Jensen and Hipwell's allegations 
of fraud on the part of McKay-Dee are suffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations as to 
McKay-Dee. These issues were not dis-
cussed in our initial opinion. 
[9,10] As to the first issue, whether Dr. 
Healy's fraudulent collusion with Jensen and 
Hipwell's original attorney can toll the stat-
ute of limitations as to McKay-Dee, the gen-
eral rule is that fraud committed by a third 
party m concealing a cause of action against 
another defendant will not toll the statute of 
limitations as to that defendant. See 51 A. 
Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 150 (1970). 
Where, however, there is an agency or privi-
1. The cases cited also include two other factors 
to consider m determining whether an agent s 
conduct will be imputed to the principal m the 
employment context (^ whether the employee's 
conduct is of the general kind the emplo)ee is 
expected to perform, and (n) whether the em-
ployee's conduct occurred withm the hours of 
the employee s work and ordinary spatial bound-
aries Hodocs 811 P 2d at 156 Bvknei, 111 
ty relationship between the third party com-
mitting the fraud and the defendant, our 
cases indicate that liability for the agent's 
negligent or intentional tort can be imputed 
to the principal if the agent acts m whole or 
in part to carry out the purposes of the 
principal. See Hodges v Gibson Prods Co., 
811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County, 171 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 
1989).l On the record before us, we cannot 
determine whether Dr. Healy's fraud in col-
luding with attorney Sharp and attorney 
Healy should be imputed to McKay-Dee ab-
sent two factual findings: (i) that Dr. Healy 
was McKay-Dee's agent; and (ii) that Dr. 
Healy acted in whole or in part to further the 
aims of McKay-Dee. The complaint makes 
no allegations regarding these issues. We 
remand to the trial court for further proceed-
ings. 
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy was 
McKay-Dee's agent and that he acted at' 
least in part to further McKay-Dee's aims, it 
should impute liability for Dr. Healy's fraud 
to McKay-Dee and toll the statute of limita-
tions as to McKay-Dee to the same extent it 
is tolled as to Dr. Healy.2 If, on the other 
hand, the trial court finds either that^  Dr. 
Healy was not McKay-Dee's agent or that 
Dr. Healy acted "entirely on personal mo-
tives unrelated to [McKay-Dee's] interests," 
Hodges, 811 P.2d at 157, then Dr. Healy's 
fraud does not toll the statute of limitations 
as to McKay-Dee and Jensen and Hipwell's 
claims against McKay-Dee are barred. 
Moving to the second issue raised on re-
hearing, Jensen and Hipwell argue that the 
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee 
should be tolled because of fraud allegedly 
committed by McKay-Dee, through one of its 
doctors, in participating in an allegedly 
fraudulent transfer of Shelly Hipwell from 
McKay-Dee to University Hospital. Jensen 
apply to the question of whether Dr Healy's acts 
fall withm the scope of any agency relationship 
he may have had with McKay-Dee. 
2. We note, however, that this issue will be moot 
if the fact finder determines, pursuant to our 
prior opinion, that Jensen and Hipwell's com-
plaint was not timely filed because Dr Healy's 
£_« ,A A,A -nr\t mil thp statute of limitations long 
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and Hipwell did not originally argue that 
McKay-Dee had committed fraud that would 
toll the statute of limitations. Their com-
plaint did, however, include a count of con-
structive fraud against McKay-Dee. The 
trial court held first that the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations, section 78-14-
4 of the Code, barred Jensen and Hipwell's 
claim of constructive fraud against McKay-
Dee. In the alternative, the trial court ruled 
that the claim was "unsupported by the 
facts" and that there was "insufficient evi-
dence to submit this matter to a jury as the 
fact finder." In our original opinion, we 
Upheld the trial court's finding that Jensen 
and Hipwell's claim for constructive fraud 
amounted to nothing more than a claim for 
medical malpractice, which would be barred 
by the medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions. Jensen, at 337. We did not address, 
however, the contention that Jensen and Hip-
Well's allegations of constructive fraud on the 
part of McKay-Dee would be sufficient to toll 
the statute of limitations on Jensen and Hip-
Well's medical malpractice claims against 
McKay-Dee. We find that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment to 
McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and Hip-
well's constructive fraud claim was insuffi-
ciency supported by the evidence and there-
fore could^not be used to toll the statute of 
limitations. 
Addressing the merits of this claim re-
quires a careful analysis of the relative bur-
dens of proof and production involved in 
making and opposing a motion for summary 
judgment. As noted above, when reviewing 
a motion for summary judgment, we view all 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Id. at 328. On a motion for 
summary judgment, the moving party bears 
the burden of proof for its motion, namely, 
the burden of proving that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. However, in opposing a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still 
has the ultimate burden of proving all the 
elements of his or her cause of action. 
Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 
120, 124 (Utah 1994). Further, once chal-
support his or her claim, particularly when 
that party has had an opportunity to conduct -
discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party opposing a 
properly supported motion for summary 
judgment "may not rest upon the mere alle-
gations or denials of his [or her] pleading, 
but his [or her] response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial? Utah R. Civ. P. • 
56(e) (emphasis added). Put another way, 
once the moving party has brought forth 
evidence either tending to prove a lack of 
genuine issue of material fact or challenging 
the existence of one of the elements of the 
cause of action, the nonmovmg party then, 
bears the burden of "providing] some evi-
dence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of 
the essential elements of his [or her] claim." 
Thayne, 814 P.2d at 124. 
[ll, 12] In this case, Jensen and Hipwell 
failed to provide any such evidence to sup-
port their claim of constructive' fraud. ' Con-
structive fraud requires two elements:" (i) a 
confidential relationship between the parties; 
and (ii) a failure to disclose material facts. 
See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02 
(Utah 1978); 37 Am'. Jur.' 2d Fraud and! 
Deceit §§ 4, 15 (1968). Jensen and Hipwell's 
complaint alleges both (i) that McKay-Dee's' 
employee, Dr. Baughman, had a confidential 
relationship with Shelly'and her family as 
one of her treating physicians, and (ii) that 
Dr. Baughman failed to disclose that he had 
committed medical malpractice in treating 
Shelly. McKay-Dee's motion for summary 
judgment did not challenge Jensen and Hip-
well's assertion that Dr. Baughman had a 
confidential relationship with Shelly and her 
family. McKay-Dee's motion, however, did 
dispute Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that 
Dr. Baughman failed to disclose his alleged 
malpractice. McKay-Dee produced the de-
position of Dr. Baughman, wherein he states, 
"I have no question at all that [Shelly] re-
ceived care that's exemplary, that could be 
used as an example of the management of a 
good operation." Dr. Baughman further in-
dicated that he held that belief at the time he 
provided Shelly's care. McKay-Dee proper-
ly, --L^-n__^ T « . „„A U I ^ A I I ' . nlloo-of^v, 
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his duty to disclose material facts to them, 
namely, the fact that he had committed mal-
practice, by producing Dr. Baughman's depo-
sition in which he states that he did not 
believe and does not believe that he commit-
ted malpractice. 
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the non-
moving parties, utterly failed to meet their 
burden of coming forward with evidence to 
contradict Dr. Baughman's deposition testi-
mony. In their opposition to McKay-Dee's 
motion for summary judgment, Jensen and 
Hipwell simply reiterate the allegations of 
their complaint and provide no support for 
their claim that Dr. Baughman failed to tell 
them that Shelly had been "left to bleed 
internally for several hours before accurately 
diagnosing her illness." Dr. Baughman's de-
position testimony specifically and directly 
challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion, 
and they failed to provide any evidence to 
support their claim. Thus, the' trial court 
correctly ruled that there was insufficient 
evidence to submit the matter to a jury. 
Because Jensen and Hipwell's claim of con-
structive fraud against McKay-Dee was in-
sufficiently supported by the evidence, such a 
claim cannot be used to toll the statute of 
limitations on -their medical malpractice 
claims against McKay-Dee. 
-We remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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No. 950506. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
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Seller of stock sued buyer, seeking to 
under which buyer was to pay seller $25,000 
as final amount owed,for shares. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County/ J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., dismissed complaint on 
grounds that accord and satisfaction lacked 
consideration, and 'seller appealed. The 
' Court of Appeals, 905 P.2d 301, reversed and 
remanded. Certiorari was granted. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
Court of Appeals erred by accepting' trial 
court's fact finding that parties were mutual-
ly mistaken in concluding that $25,000 was 
owed on contract, and then determining that 
amount due was uncertain, as required for 
accord and satisfaction to apply, and (2) fail-
ure to object at trial precluded challenge to 
trial court's allowance of counterclaim by 
buyer, alleging overpayment of $169,501.75. 
Court of Appeals' judgment reversed; 
trial court's judgment reinstated. 
1. Appeal and Error <£=*S42(2), 1083(1) 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's" 
conclusions of law for correctness, and like-
wise Supreme Court accord's no particular' 
deference to conclusions of law made by 
Court of Appeals, but* reviews such conclu-
sions for correctness. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>1008.1(5) 
Court of Appeals may reverse factual 
finding of trial court only if it determines§ 
that finding is "clearly erroneous," that is, if 
trial court's ruling contradicts great weight 
of evidence or if court renewing evidence is 
left with definite and firm conviction that. 
mistake has been made. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 52(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 4 
3. Appeal and Error ®=>1094(1) 
Court of Appeals erred by purporting to 
accept trial court's factual determination that 
parties to sale of stock mistakenly believed 
that buyer owed seller an additional $25,000, 
HLEBtilSiaiG. «4KJHT 
Third Judicial' District 
FEB 7 \ 
By-f. Co 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
' ,PP0-> 
Dfcpuiy Cleric 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually and on 
behalf of all other heirs of 
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley 
Michele Hipwell and Kaycie 
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IHC HOSPITALS, INC,, dba 
McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL 
J. HEALY, M.D., AND DOES 
I through X, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 920904182 
This case was before the Court on January 9, 1995 for oral 
argument on defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs were represented by Richard Burbidge, Gary Johnson and 
Simon Forgette. Defendant Healy was represented by Elliott 
Williams, defendant IHC Hospitals was represented by James Gilson 
and Kathy Lavitt. After oral argument, the Court took the matter 
under advisement. The Court has reviewed the Memoranda and 
exhibits submitted in support and opposition to the parties' 
respective positions, and has reviewed a transcript of the oral 
arguments made to the Court on January 9, 1995. The reason for a 
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seemingly long delay from oral argument to decision was based 
partially on the Court's availability of time, the voluminous 
documents submitted by the parties, but mainly on the difficulties 
in fully examining and assessing the legal, factual and equitable 
issues involved in this case. 
To begin with, the main contention of the defendants is that 
all of plaintiffs' claims are barred by the two year statute of 
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-4. The 
plaintiffs respond by asserting that the applicable statute of 
limitations is Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28(2) regarding 
wrongful death actions, and also that any statute of limitations 
was tolled, based upon the minority of the deceased's children, and 
finally, material issues of fact preclude Summary Judgment on all 
issues dealing with the statute of limitations. 
Utah's medical malpractice statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann., Section 78-14-4, provides, among other things: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may 
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence. . . . 
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To aid in the interpretation of this section, the Court has 
read in detail the following cases: 
1. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) 
2. Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah App. 1989) 
3. Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 
(Utah 1989). 
While these cases are factually different and do not address 
identical legal issues, they generally hold that the statute of 
limitations does not commence until the plaintiff is in possession 
of facts that would indicate that a reasonable person knew or 
should have known that they have sustained an injury, and knew or 
should have known that the injury may have been caused by 
negligence. Chapman further discusses discovery of legal injury 
encompassing both awareness of physical injury and knowledge that 
the injury is or may be attributable to negligence. 
I am aware of plaintiffs' position in that the wrongful death 
action by the mother and husband of the deceased was timely filed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28(2), and further that 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-36 tolls the time for a minor 
bringing a cause of action until the minor reaches majority; 
however, this analysis will deal mainly with the interpretation and 
dispositive nature of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-4. 
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The initial investigation of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital 
by attorney Roger Sharp in early 1989 is the earliest date that 
defendants rely upon to commence the running of the statute of 
limitations. While plaintiffs characterize his investigation as a 
sham, it is apparent that Sharp, at least, was aware of possible 
claims against both Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital. While 
criticism by plaintiffs as to the scope and legitimacy of Sharp's 
inquiry, it is not disputed that by April, 1989, he clearly 
considered Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital as potential 
defendants. The retention of Dr. Johnson in April, 1989, to review 
medical records, albeit in abbreviated form, was done in connection 
with possible claims against both defendants. While the Court is 
extremely critical of the actions taken by Roger Sharp, attorney 
Tim Healy and Diane DeVries, in the manner that this case was 
solicited, the eventual retention of Roger Sharp and his initial 
inquiry into the case started the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
Even after the questionable settlement was reached by order of 
the Court on May 22, 198 9, the plaintiffs had further opportunity 
to undertake additional investigation into the possibly ongoing 
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital. 
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On or about August 10, 198 9, the law office of Simon Forgette 
had been contacted by Carol Pederson regarding the inadequacy of 
the settlement in Hipwell's case. On August 29, 1989, Mr. Forgette 
spoke with Pederson and by September 18, 1989 he was outlining 
possible problems with the settlement and conduct of attorney 
Sharp. On October 19, 1989, he was orally retained by Sherry 
Jensen to investigate this case. By mid-1990, his investigation 
was well underway regarding the possible legal malpractice 
involved, and the underlying claims that were a basis for the legal 
malpractice, i.e., the possible medical malpractice. 
It is the Court's opinion that Mr. Forgette had to consider 
the possibility of negligence on the part of Dr. Healy and McKay-
Dee Hospital in assessing the basis for the legal malpractice 
action. Even though Forgette was not finally retained until 
January, 1990, his oral retention of October 19, 1989 clearly 
demonstrated that Forgette was in possession of facts whereby he 
knew or should have known that Sherry Hipwell's condition was 
caused or possibly caused by negligence on the part of McKay-Dee 
Hospital and Dr. Healy. Therefore, the December 16, 1991 filing of 
a Notice of Intent to commence a medical malpractice action against 
Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital is barred by Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-14-4. 
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Plaintiffs' survival action is also barred by the statute of 
limitations in that the claim is a continuation of the decedent's 
cause of action for personal injury, and survivors are in no better 
position than the decedent had the decedent survived. 
Plaintiffs' wrongful death action is more problematic to the 
Court. I recognize that this is separate and distinct from the 
survival claims, and both sides have ably supported their positions 
with case law and argument. Nonetheless, the Court finds that 
because the medical malpractice statute of limitations barred 
Sherry Hipwell's action at the time of her death and thus bars the 
survival action, plaintiffs have no wrongful death claim. This is 
based upon the proposition that plaintiffs have a right to proceed 
against defendants, but their rights are subject to any defenses 
available against the deceased had the deceased lived and 
prosecuted the suit in their own behalf. 
Turning to the plaintiffs' fraud claims against Dr. Healy, the 
controlling statute of limitations is not Utah Code Ann., Section 
78-12-26(3), but rather Section 78-14-4. With that, the fraud 
claims are also barred; however, if they were not barred, the 
existence of material facts in dispute would make this issue one 
for the jury. 
A a1 4 ^  A t 
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The claim for constructive fraud against McKay-Dee Hospital is 
also barred by Section 78-14-4(1)(b) and even if it were not, this 
claim is unsupported by the facts. There is insufficient evidence 
to submit this matter to a jury as the fact finder. 
Finally, plaintiffs' May 17, 1989 Release of All Claims does 
not bar plaintiffs' claims in this action. While the plain 
language of the Release is clear and unambiguous, its effect must 
be read in conjunction with the May 22, 1989 probate order and the 
amended order authorizing the settlement with the University 
Hospital and Dr. Weis, not as against all potential defendants. 
I have been extremely impressed with the work done by all 
counsel, both in written briefs, as well as oral argument. This 
decision was not one in which I considered lightly, but it was one 
which was reached with considerable effort, taking into account the 
facts, legal theories and equities involved. I am sure this case 
will be subject to appellate review, and I look forward to 
direction from the appellate courts in future proceedings. Mr. 
Williams please prepare the necessary documents pursuant to this 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually and on 
behalf of all other heirs of 
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley 
Michele Hipwell and Kaycie 
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by 
Shayne Hipwell as Guardian Ad 
Litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba 
McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL; 
MICHAEL J. HEALY, M.D. and 
DOES I THROUGH X, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920904182 CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendants. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants IHC Hospitals, 
Inc, dba McKay-Dee Hospital and Michael J. Healy, M.D. came on 
regularly for hearing and disposition before the above-entitled 
Court on January 9, 1995, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
presiding. Plaintiffs were represented by Richard D. Burbidge, 
Esq., Gary R. Johnson, Esq. and Simon H. Forgette, Esq. 
Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. was represented by Elliott J. 
Williams, Esq. and Kurt M. Frankenburg, Esq. Defendant IHC 
Hospitals, Inc. was represented by James W. Gilson, Esq. and 
Kathy A. Lavitt, Esq. The Court, having reviewed and analyzed 
the extensive memoranda, affidavits and supporting materials 
filed by the parties, having entertained and considered oral 
arguments of counsel, having taken the matter under advisement 
and having issued its written Amended Memorandum Decision on 
February 21, 1995, in accordance with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, now therefore, for the reasons and upon the 
grounds set forth in the Amended Memorandum Decision, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted and 
judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants and against 
Plaintiffs, no cause.jaf,action, with costs awarded to Defendants. 
Dated this •TJJ''T^dav of March, 1995. 
BY THJ^C&iTkT: 
GLENN K. IWA'SAKI (/ 
District Court Judge 
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Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
January 28, 1998 
In Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 
(April 4,1997), the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
Fraudulent concealment requires that one 
with a legal duty or obligation to 
communicate certain facts remain silent or 
otherwise act to conceal material facts known 
to him. 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 
(1968). Such a duty or obligation may arise 
from a relationship of trust between the 
parties, and inequality of knowledge or power 
between the parties, or other attendant 
circumstances indicating reliance. Id. The 
party's silence must amount to fraud. . . Id. 
Such "concealment or nondisclosure becomes 
fraudulent only when there is an existing 
fact or condition. . . which the party 
charged is under a duty to disclose." Id. 
1 
Making use of a device that misleads, some 
trick or contrivance that is intended to 
exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry, may 
also amount to fraudulent concealment. Id. 
It is this aspect of fraudulent concealment 
that is at issue in the instant, (emphasis 
added). 
Shelly's family's argument must run as 
follows: (I) Dr. Healy was in a position of 
superior knowledge and was the beneficiary of 
Shelly's and her family's trust; (ii) this 
superior knowledge and position of trust 
created a duty to disclose material facts 
regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy knew 
of his brother's involvement with attorney 
Sharp and knew of the cursory nature of-
attorney Sharp's investigation but did not 
disclose these facts to Shelly's family or, 
alternatively, concealed them from Shelly's 
family to divert attention from his alleged 
malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that 
Shelly's family would rely on attorney 
Sharp's investigation to uncover any 
malpractice on his part, thus creating a duty 
on his part to disclose the facts of his 
association with attorneys Healy and Sharp; 
(v) in this manner, Dr. Healy used his 
position of influence with his brother and 
attorney Sharp to divert Shelly's family's 
attention away from his care of Shelly 
thereby preventing them from discovering the 
facts constitution the alleged malpractice. 
Therefore, despite the statement, "The question becomes: 
Would a reasonable attorney, presented with the facts that 
attorney Forgette knew in December of 1989, have considered 
investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr. Healy and 
McKay-Dee" the Supreme Court of Utah clearly contemplated a much 
more detailed examination of the facts than merely inquiring 
regarding what Forgette knew. Indeed, immediately preceding the 
2 
aforementioned was the statement: 
xxIn other words, the jury must determine 
whether the facts in this case indicate that 
Dr. Healy's fraudulent concealment somehow 
prevented Shelly's family, who, by retaining 
attorney Forgette, had defeated the collusion 
of Dr. Healy with his brother and attorney 
Sharp, from inquiring into the possibility of 
medical malpractice on the part of Dr. Healy 
and McKay-Dee." (emphasis added). 
Although not completely clear, this statement seems to indicate 
some investigation regarding the effect of the concealment on 
Shelly's family is mandated. 
This having been said, however, the Court is not persuaded 
that a full trial of all the issues involved is mandated in this 
case. Rather, the Court is convinced that a separate trial on 
the statute of limitations issue, which includes inquiry into the 
effect of any concealment on Shelly's family's knowledge 
regarding a possible cause of action, would be the most effective 
method of resolving this matter. As noted by the Utah Supreme 
Court, the outcome of this issue "will determine whether Shelly's 
family is entitled to proceed on both their survival claims and 
their wrongful death claims." Jensen supra. 
In addition to promoting fairness and efficiency, such a 
resolution is supported by Utah law. Specifically, in Peschamps 
v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Utah, noting the case of Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 
1979)—which addressed the legal injury test, stated: 
[A] legal determination of negligence is not 
3 
necessary to start the statute of 
limitations. Rather, the crucial question is 
whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts 
that would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that he may have a cause of action 
against the health care provider. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Joint Motion for 
Separate Trial on the Statute of limitations Issue is granted, in 
part. Inquiry regarding the effect of any fraudulent concealment 
on Shelly's family's knowledge regarding a possible cause of 
action will be allowed. Accordingly, the issues of medical 
negligence, causation and damages are reserved for a subsequent 
DATED this {*JLy day of January, 1998. 
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Case No. 920904182 CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
October 29, 1998 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
defendant, IHC Hospitals', Inc.'s Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of Gregory DeVore, and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, 
Alternatively for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument 
on the motions on September 28, 1998. Following the hearing, the 
matters were taken under advisement. 
As an initial concern, the Court notes that pursuant to Rule 
12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered 
(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading no 
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state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
In the instant matter, defendant has submitted the affidavit 
of Thomas Hanrahan in support of its position that Dr. Healy, 
and/or Dr. Baughman, were acting outside the scope of their 
employment. Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or Alternatively for Summary Judgment is most 
appropriately treated as a motion for summary judgment. 
1. Motion to Strike 
With this motion, defendant seeks to strike the affidavit of 
Dr. Gregory DeVore arguing (1) it raises allegations which have not 
been pled; (2) Dr. DeVore, a perinatologist, is incompetent to 
testify about the standard of care of Dr. Baughman, an intensivist; 
and (3) Dr. DeVore lacks personal knowledge of the relationship 
between Healy and McKay-Dee. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion contending Dr. DeVore has 
unquestionable professional credentials and is very familiar with 
toxemia and HELLP Syndrome, which occurred in this case. Moreover, 
contend plaintiffs, although Dr. DeVore is a perinatologist, the 
standard of care for the treatment of HELLP Syndrome is identical 
for perinatologists, obstetricians and mtensivists. Furthermore, 
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it is plaintiffs' position Dr. DeVore has personal knowledge and is 
intimately familiar with the day to day operations of the defendant 
hospital and is familiar with the relationship between doctors 
having staff privileges ar the hospital and the McKay-Dee staff and 
administration. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. 
In the case at bar, Dr. DeVore's Affidavit establishes he has 
sufficient professional credentials, has reviewed all of Shelly 
Hipwell's medical records and is intimately familiar with toxemia 
and HELLP Syndrome. Further, although Dr. DeVore is a 
perinatologist, his uncontroverted affidavit demonstrates that the 
standard of care for the treatment of HELLP Syndrome is identical 
for perinatologists, obstetricians and intensivists. Finally, for 
the reasons stated in the following ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment, the Court finds defendant's assertion that the 
affidavit raises allegations which have not been pled is without 
merit. Based upon the forgoing, the motion to strike is 
respectfully denied. 
2. Motion for Summary Judgment 
With this motion, defendant contends Dr. Healy's alleged fraud 
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does not toll the statute of limitations because (1) as recognized 
by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs' complaint makes no allegations 
either that Dr. Healy was the agent of McKay-Dee or that he acted 
to further the aims of McKay Dee; (2) Dr. Healy was, in fact, not 
an agent of McKay Dee because, as noted in the case of Tolman v. 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 382 (D. Utah CD. 1986), an 
independently acting "physician could not act as agent of the 
hospital"; and (3) even if Dr. Healy had been McKay-Dee's agent, 
his fraudulent concealment was not within the scope of his agency. 
Indeed, asserts defendant, as noted in the affidavit of Thomas 
Hanrahan, Dr. Healy's fraudulent actions would have been contrary 
to McKay-Dee's interest to review, evaluate, and correct patient 
care problems through its quality improvement program. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion asserting they have alleged facts 
which would support a finding that a privity and/or an agency 
relationship existed between Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee and that the 
actions to cover up his negligence were, at least in part, in 
furtherance of McKay-Dee's interests. Moreover, although Dr. Healy 
was not technically an employee of McKay-Dee he nevertheless had a 
privity and/or agency relationship with the facility as he worked 
in a partnership and close concerted effort with hospital staff 
physicians such as Dr. Baughman and the ICU medical director. 
Further, assert plaintiffs, Dr. Healy's involvement of his brother 
was in furtherance of the common design that he and Dr. Eaughman 
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had in transferring Shelly Hipwell out of the IHC system, namely, 
covering up their joint negligence arising out of the co-management 
of Shelly Hipwell's care in the ICU at McKay-Dee. 
"In reviewing a summary judgment, this court 
must liberally construe the evidence and all 
inferences that may be reasonably drawn from 
the evidence in favor of the party opposing 
the motion." Evans v. GTE Health Svs. Inc., 
857 P.2d 974, 976 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 
868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). "The trial court must 
not weigh evidence or assess credibility" in a 
summary judgment. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & MIIPS. 681 P.2d 1258, 
1261 (Utah 1984). In short, a court should not 
make findings of fact in a summary judgment 
other than a restatement of the undisputed 
facts stated in favor of the nonmoving party. 
See Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415, 418 n.8 (Utah App. 
1990), revfd on other grounds, 844 P.2d 322 
(Utah 1992). 
Doubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In its August 22, 1997 decision, the Supreme Court stated the 
following: 
Jensen and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy, 
who had staff privileges at McKay-Dee but was 
not employed by McKay-Dee, committed 
malpractice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's 
daughter and Hipwell!s wife) while she was a 
patient at McKay-Dee. They claim that, to 
cover his alleged malpractice, he and a 
McKay-Dee doctor fraudulently transferred 
Shelly to University Hospital. Jensen and 
Hipwell further allege that Dr. Healy then 
colluded with his brother, attorney Tim Healy, 
and attorney Roger Sharp to prevent Jensen and 
Hipwell from learning of the malpractice Dr. 
Healy had allegedly committed. Jensen and 
Hipwell made no allegation that McKay-Dee knew 
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about Dr. Healy's collusion with his brother 
and attorney Sharp. 
As to the first issue, whether Dr. 
Healy's fraudulent collusion with Jensen and 
HipwellTs original attorney can toll the 
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee, the 
general rule is that fraud committed by a 
third party in concealing a cause of action 
against another defendant will not toll the 
statute of limitations as to that defendant. 
See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 150 
(1970) . Where, however, there is an agency or 
privity relationship between the third party 
committing the fraud and the defendant, our 
cases indicate that liability for the agent!s 
negligent or intentional tort can be imputed 
to the principal if the agent acts in whole or 
in part to carry out the purposes of the 
principal. See Hodaes v. Gibson Prods. Co., 
811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt 
Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). 
On the record before us, we cannot determine 
whether Dr. Healy's fraud in colluding with 
attorney Sharp and attorney Healy should be 
imputed to McKay-Dee absent two factual 
findings: (i) that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's 
agent; and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted in whole 
or in part to further the aims of McKay-Dee. 
The complaint makes no allegations regarding 
these issues. We remand to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337, 338. 
In light of the aforementioned directives it is clear the 
Supreme Court, based upon the same arguments made in support of 
this motion, determined this was not an issue of pleadings. 
Indeed, this was made abundantly clear when the Supreme Court, in 
spite of its statement that xx[t]he complaint makes no allegations 
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regarding these issues," remanded the matter for two specific 
factual findings Id. Accordingly, despite any opinion of this 
Court to the contrary, the pleadings with respect to these issues 
have already been determined to be sufficient. 
Turning next to the question of whether Dr. Healy was McKay-
Dee's agent, it is critical to note the Supreme Court specifically 
used the term "privity" thus signaling the possibility of liability 
based upon something less than an actual agency relationship. With 
this in mind, and after reviewing plaintiffs' complaint as well as 
the affidavit of Dr. DeVore, it appears plaintiffs have alleged 
facts which support a finding that such a privity or agency-like 
relationship existed between Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
Specifically, according to the affidavit of Dr. DeVore, Dr. Healy 
worked in a partnership and close concerted effort with the 
hospital staff, including staff physicians. From these statements, 
as well as others made by Dr. DeVore, a jury could reasonably 
conclude the requisite relationship, as defined by the Supreme 
Court, existed and accordingly, Dr. Healy's conduct could be 
imputed to McKay-Dee. 
Finally, if an agency or privity relationship is found to have 
been created between Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee, the Court is 
persuaded a jury could reasonably find that the actions taken by 
Dr. Healy, allegedly to cover up his negligence, were, at least in 
part, done in furtherance of McKay-Dee's interests. 
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Based upon the forgoing, defendant's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, treated as 
a motion for summary -judgment, is respectfully denied, 
DATED this C ' day of October, 1998. 
\, At, ^ 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 920904182CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
July 27, 1999 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendants' Joint Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form and 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form. Oral 
argument was held with respect to these motions on July 26, 1999. 
Following the hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having now considered the motions and memoranda as 
well as the applicable statutory and case law hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
With their motion, defendants seek to have the following 
special verdict form presented to the jury in the statute of 
limitations trial: "Would a reasonable attorney, presented with the 
facts that attorney Forgette knew prior to December 16, 1989, have 
considered investigating a medical malpractice case against Dr. 
Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital?" 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion and seek to have the following on 
the special verdict form: ''Prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney 
Forgette discover or under the circumstances is it reasonable that 
he should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell 
by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital?" 
Pursuant to § 78-14-4, the statute of limitations begins to 
run at the time "the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs." In their opinion, the Supreme Court 
reaffirms this standard stating "[t]he issue before the trier of 
fact in this case is whether attorney Forgette discovered or 
reasonably should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly 
Hipwell before December 16, 1989." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
944 P.2d 327, 335 (Utah 1997). Indeed, an unbroken line of cases 
makes clear this is the state of the law in Utah.1 Furthermore, 
"[d]iscovery of legal injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness 
of physical injury and knowledge that the injury is or may be 
attributable to negligence." Collins v. Wilson, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 
1
 See, Collins v. Wilson, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 9 (Utah 
1999) ("We have long held that the two-year statute of 
limitations period commences to run only when the injured person 
knew or should have known or an injury and that the injury was 
caused by a negligent act.") See also Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 
1361, 1363 (Utah 1996); Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 147-148 
(Urah 1979). 
6, 9 (Utah 1999) (quoting Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 
P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added in Collins) . 
Despite language in Jensen indicating the legal standard is 
when Forgette first considered or should have considered a medical 
malpractice case against the defendants, the aforementioned makes 
clear the appropriate legal standard is as set forth by plaintiffs 
in their proposed special verdict. Accordingly, Defendants' Joint 
Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form is denied and 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Special Verdict Form is granted. 
DATED this 2 / day of July, 1999. 
By. Deputy Cleric 
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CASE NO. 920904182 
The above-entitled matter was before the Court for oral 
argument on October 13, 1999, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. Richard D. 
Burbidge .and Simon H. Forgette on behalf of plaintiffs, Elliott J. 
Williams, Kurt M. Frankenberg, Richard W. Casey, Andrew Diess, and 
James W. Gilson for defendants. The Court heard oral argument on 
various Motions filed by the parties, and took the matter under 
advisement. After consideration of Memoranda, oral argument, and 
previous rulings of the Court, the Court rules as follows: 
1. The Court denies defendants1 Motion to Modify the 
approved Special Verdict Form. As previously ruled upon, the issue 
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before the jury will be "prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney 
Forgette discover, or under the circumstances is it reasonable that 
he should have discovered, the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell 
by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital." 
2. Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction regarding 
"discover" or "discovered" is denied. The Court will give 
defendants1 proposed instruction as contained in MUJI 6.37. 
3. The balance of the defendants1 requested jury 
instructions on imputed knowledge of attorney and discovery by 
Roger Sharp will not be received. 
4. Any evidence of fraudulent concealment or coverup will be 
allowed only to the extent that it is necessary to rebut facts or 
inferences of what attorney Forgette should have known prior to 
December 16, 1989. It is not the Court's intention to allow 
plaintiff to put on every single aspect of the allegations of 
fraudulent coverup in their case in chief, but rather to restrict 
it to those parts pertinent as to issues raised by the defense 
regarding the scope of knowledge that Forgette knew or should have 
known. 
5. With the ruling of the Court reemphasizing the scope of 
the first trial, the Motion in Limine regarding agency and privity 
is not relevant and said Motion will be granted. 
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6. Evidence of the alleged lacerated liver and other 
references to damage to the liver will be allowed; any material 
contained in Forgette's file after 12/16/89 will be subject to 
relevance and objections thereto; Forgettefs contemplated 
contingency fee agreement in total will be allowed; there will be 
no mention of previous Summary Judgments or prior appeals in this 
matter; and the Court grants the plaintiffs' Motion in Limine as to 
the subsequent determination by this Court that the release of 
McKay-Dee was not valid. 
7. Plaintiffs1 Motions in Limine/Exclusion as to the 
testimony of attorneys Thronson and Jacobson are presently denied; 
the Court had indicated in oral argument that I would have to rule 
on evidentiary objections as they were raised during 
examination/cross-examination. 
Dated this day of O^ fcqijer, 19 99 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually and on behalf 
of all other heirs of Shelly Hipwell; and 
ASHLEY MICHELLE HIPWELL and 
KAYCIE SHAYLENE HIPWELL, 
appearing by SHAYNE HIPWELL, as 
Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-
DEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY, 
M.D.; and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT
 nim msTBICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
CT 2 6 1999 
SAL/ LAK£ CO' 
& 
Deputy Cleric 
Civil No. 920904182CV 
(Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki) 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following question: 
1. Prior to December 16, 1989, did attorney Forgette discover, or under the 
circumstances is it reasonable that he should have discovered, the legal injury done to 
Shelly Hipwell by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital? 
ANSWER: YES NO _ 
DATED this a 4-May of October, 1999. 
FOREPERSON ~ 
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Case No. 920904182CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
February 16, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in 
the Alternative, for a New Trial. The Court heard oral argument 
with respect to this motion on February 2, 2000. Following the 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
1. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be granted only 
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when the losing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). Courts will only 
revise a verdict if, in viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed, they conclude that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Id. 
Defendants move this Court for a judgment as a matter of law 
arguing the undisputed evidence at trial establishes that 
(objectively) an attorney possessing the information Forgette had 
prior to December 16, 1989, would have inquired into the 
possibility of defendants' malpractice. 
In the instant case, viewing all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, specifically, the testimony of 
Forgette and the records from IHC d.b.a. McKay-Dee Hospital which 
reflected no indication of medical negligence at McKay-Dee, the 
Court is persuaded a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is not 
appropriate in this matter 
2. New Trial 
When a party challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying 
a jury's decision, the trial court should grant a new trial "only 
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991) . 
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With this motion, defendants argue a new trial is appropriate 
for three reasons: (1) the jury's decision necessarily ignored the 
undisputed testimony regarding a reasonable attorney and therefore, 
is manifestly against the weight of the evidence; (2) the special 
verdict misstated the question the Supreme Court specifically 
remanded to be answered, failed to make clear that Forgette's 
conduct was to be measured against that of a reasonable attorney, 
and inevitably confused the jury; and (3) plaintiffs' expert L. 
Rich Humpherys wrongly testified that under Utah law, discovery 
does not begin when an attorney inquiries into the possibility of 
medical malpractice. 
With respect to the first basis for a new trial, as noted 
above, the jury's decision was not manifestly against the weight of 
the evidence. 
As to the special verdict, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
No party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving 
of an instruction, a party must state 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds for his objection. 
While there was much debate over what the special verdict form 
was to say, there was no objection following the Court's ruling and 
prior to the jury retiring. Moreover, even if the Court gives 
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weight to defendants' claim that they previously objected to the 
verdict form, it was not the same question they now argue should 
have been given. 
Finally, the verdict form which was adopted by the Court was 
taken directly from the Supreme Court decision in Jensen v. IHC 
wherein the court stated NN[t]he issue before the their of fact in 
this case is whether attorney Forgette discovered or reasonably 
should have discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell 
before December 16, 1989." Despite defendants' argument to the 
contrary, this verdict clearly incorporates the standard of a 
reasonable attorney. 
As to the testimony of Humphreys, after reviewing the record, 
the Court is persuaded it was consistent with the instructions and 
the verdict form given to the jury by the Court. Indeed, based 
upon the instruction regarding legal injury, Humphreys opined that 
a reasonable attorney would not have discovered the legal injury 
done to Shelly Hipwell prior to December 16, 1989. Moreover, 
whether Humphreys' expert opinion was credible was for defendants 
to argue and the jury to decide. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Motion Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the Alternative, for a New 
Trial is denied. 
JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS Page 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DATED this/ / day of February, 2000, 
GLENN K. IWASXKI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 920904182 CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
May 19, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants' Joint Motion 
to Confirm Dismissal of Fraud Claims. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motions on May 15, 2000. Following 
the hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
With their Fourth Amended Complaint, plaintiffs seek to amend 
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what they characterize as "fraud/fraudulent concealment" and 
constructive fraud claims against Dr. Healy and IHC on the theory 
that Dr. Healy acted as an agent of, or in privity with, IHC. 
Defendants jointly oppose the motion and seek dismissal of 
plaintiffs' fraud claims arguing the Supreme Court has already 
ruled that plaintiffs cannot "proceed on their separate claims for 
common law fraud." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 
331 (Utah 1997). Accordingly, it is defendants' position dismissal 
is appropriate. 
Plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motion argue what the 
Supreme Court rejected were not their causes of action for fraud, 
but instead, plaintiffs' contention that a three year statute of 
limitations, rather than a two year statute of limitations, should 
apply to them. According to plaintiffs, the issue of damages 
caused by the defendants' fraud has never been before the Supreme 
Court of Utah. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the 
Jensen decision, the Court is persuaded defendants are correct in 
their analysis of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, despite 
some rather contradictory dicta, it is clear the Supreme Court in 
Jensen rejected the existence of plaintiffs' independent fraud 
claim. Notably, the Supreme Court stated the following in its 
original opinion: 
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Shelly's family argues that it has made a 
general fraud claim and a constructive fraud 
claim in addition to, and distinct from, their 
claims of fraudulent concealment discussed 
above. However, we can find nothing in their 
allegation of fraud or constructive fraud that 
is in any way different from their claims of 
frciudulent concealment. All the allegations 
raised by Shelly!s family surround their claim 
that Dr. Healy acted to divert the family! s 
attention away from his alleged malpractice 
whem he had a duty to disclose the facts of 
his relationship with attorneys Healy and 
Sharp. The only damages arising out of 
Shcslly' s family! s claims for fraud and 
constructive fraud relate to the possibility 
that they were prevented from discovering the 
facts constituting their claim for medical 
malpractice. While we acknowledge that there 
may be cases where a doctor commits fraud on a 
patient in a way that would not be covered by 
the medical malpractice act's fraudulent 
concealment provision, this is not such a 
case. Given the specific facts alleged in this 
case, we cannot agree that Shellyf s family's 
fraud claim amounts to anything more than or 
is different from a claim of fraudulent 
concealment of medical malpractice. See 
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Inst., 7 82 P. 2d 
506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) (rejecting 
attempts to recast claim for damages arising 
out of regulators' licensing decision as claim 
for negligence to avoid governmental 
immunity). 
Id. at 336. (Emphasis added). 
Based upon this wording, it is apparent the Supreme Court 
intended to allow allegations of fraud to continue in this case 
only to the extent they related to the fraudulent concealment 
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provisions of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 1 
Indeed, their citing of the Gillman case seems to confirm this. 
Finally, a review of this Court's Memorandum Decision makes 
clear that the issues before it at that time were limited solely to 
the issue of whether plaintiffs had pled allegations of agency and 
privity sufficient to toll the statute of limitations against IHC. 
Indeed, the Court specifically stated: 
With this motion, defendant contends Dr. 
Healy's alleged fraud does not toll the 
statute of limitations because (1) as 
recognized by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs' 
complaint makes no allegations either that Dr. 
Healy was the agent of McKay-Dee or that he 
acted to further the aims of McKay Dee; (2) 
Dr. Healy was, in fact, not an agent of McKay 
Dee because, as noted in the case of Tolman v. 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 382 (D. Utah 
C D . 1986), an independently acting "physician 
could not act as agent of the hospital"; and 
(3) even if Dr. Healy had been McKay-Dee's 
agent, his fraudulent concealment was not 
within the scope of his agency. Indeed, 
asserts defendant, as noted in the affidavit 
of Thomas Hanrahan, Dr. Healy's fraudulent 
actions would have been contrary to McKay-
Dee's interest to review, evaluate, and 
correct patient care problems through its 
quality improvement program. 
In light of the forgoing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is 
denied and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Independent 
Fraud Claims is granted. Counsel for defendants is asked to 
lrThe fraudulent concealment claim has been mooted by the 
recent jury verdict. 
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prepare the appropriate order, 
DATED this / V day of May, 2000, 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. 
257 East 200 Soudi, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE HIPWELL, 
individually and on behalf of all other heirs of 
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele Hipwell and 
Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell appearing by Shayne 
Hipwell as Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-DEE 
HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY, M.D. and 
DOES I through X, 
PThlwD , , SJ f i l C T C 0«RT 
TWrd Judicial District 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS 
FRAUD CLAIMS 
Civil No. 920904182CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
JAMES W GILSON (A1197) 
SCOTT C. PUGLSEY (A2662) 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. 
36 Soudi State Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 533.8282 
RICHARD W CASEY (A0590) 
ANDREW G DEISS (A7184) 
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. dba McKay-Dee Hospital 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs5 Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants3 Joint Motion to Confirm 
Dismissal of Fraud Claims came on for hearing before the Court on May 15, 2000, 
pursuant to proper notice. Plaintiffs were represented by Richard D. Burbidge and Simon 
H. Forgette. Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. was represented by Richard C. Casey, James 
W Gilson and Andrew G. Deiss. Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. was represented by 
Elliott J. Williams and Kurt M. Frankenburg. 
The Court reviewed die motions, memoranda, and supporting materials on file, and 
heard oral argument by counsel for plaintiffs and defendants. Having taken die matter 
under advisement, and having subsequently issued its written Memorandum Decision, 
dated May 19, 2000, which is incorporated herein by reference, and good cause appearing 
therefor, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, requesting leave to file a Fourth Amended 
Complaint, is denied. 
2. Defendants' Motion to dismiss plaintiffs5 fraud claims is granted. All of 
plaintiffs5 claims set forth under die Second Cause of Action and Third Cause of Action, of 
the Third Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The date of this Order shall be deemed the effective date of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this day of 
Approved as to Form: 
By: 
BURJ3ID 
RICHARD D. B 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
% ^ 2000. 
BY THE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually, and on 
behalf of all other heirs of 
Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley 
Michelle Hipwell and Kaycie 
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by 




IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay- -
Dee Hospital, MICHAEL J. HEALY, j 
M.D., and DOES I through X. 
Defendants. 
' MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 920904182CV 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
March 21, 2001 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
several pretrial motions. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to the motions on March 21, 2001. Following the hearing, 
the Court ruled from the bench with respect to all motions, except 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on 
the Part of Defendant Dr. Healy and Defendants' Joint Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Selected Testimony of Dr. Greggory DeVore and Dr. 
Barry Schifirin. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS Page 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Turning first to plaintiffs' motion, as an initial matter, the 
Court finds that dismissal of plaintiffs' fraud claim does not 
render inadmissible probative evidence that Dr. Healy obstructed 
justice as regards a potential medical malpractice claim against 
him by Shelly Hipwell. 
This having been said, the parties do not dispute the law in 
Utah is that wrongdoing by a party "amounting to an obstruction of 
justice," can be regarded as an admission by conduct. See State v. 
Garcia, 663 P.12d 60, 65 (Utah 1993) (citing McCormick's handbook 
of the Law of Evidence, § 273 at 660 (2d ed. 1972). Applying the 
aforementioned to the facts in the record, the Court finds a jury 
could reasonably conclude Dr. Healy obstructed justice regarding a 
potential medical malpractice claim against him. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent plaintiffs have 
evidence of Dr. Healy's direct conduct from which a reasonable 
inference could be drawn that such conduct amounted to an 
obstruction of justice. 
With respect to defendants' joint motion regarding Drs. DeVore 
and Schifirin, assuming proper qualifications and the laying of 
sufficient foundation, the Court finds these individuals qualified 
to testify regarding the matters at issue. With specific regard, 
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however, to testimony addressing Ms. Hipwell's emergency room care, 
the Court finds Drs. DeVore and Schifirin are not qualified to 
testify regarding her treatment during triage stages, specifically, 
prior to her being diagnosed as needing obstetric care. 
Accordingly, forgoing any new information regarding these doctors' 
qualifications, their testimony will be limited in this manner. 
Finally, the Court, although aware of the potential need to 
rebut a credibility attack, admonishes the parties to mindful in 
avoiding the use of cumulative and duplicative testimony. 
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the matters 
addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this £ * day of March, 2001. 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. #0492 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. #2278 
JASON D. BOREN, Esq. #7816 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
SIMON H. FORGETTE, Esq. 
406 Market Street, Suite A 
Kirkland, Washington 98033 
(425) 822-7778 -
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BLEB EKSTEHCT COURT 
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IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-Dee 
Hospital, MICHAEL J. HEALY, M.D.5 and 
DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION OF FACT 
Civil No. 920904182 CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Plaintiffs and Defendants, by and through their respective counsel of record hereby 
stipulate and agree to following fact for purposes of this case: 
"Shelly Hipwell died on May 27, 1992, as a result of 
complications from anoxic brain injury suffered on or about 
January 18, 1989, while a patient at the University of Utah 
Hospital. The parties have not stipulated as to who is legally 
responsible for Mrs. Hipwell's death." 
DATED this t fae^ day of March, 2001. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Richard D. Burbidse 
DATED this the d\ day of March, 2001. 
BENDINGER CROCKETT PETERSON & CASEY 
Ric^ mrd W. Casey 
Wesley D. Felix 
DATED this the 7*7 day of March, 2001. 
Jarffes JGilson 
/ 
DATED this the 2T* day of March, 20C 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
'Elliott J(tyilliams 
Kurt M. TPrankenbers 
DATED this the day of March, 2001. 
Us>& 
Philip R Fishp 



























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ^^I^JS^CljffiWRT 
Tnrd judicial Oistna 
SHERRY JENSEN AND SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, et al. , 
AUG 0 1 2001 
By S , 0 
^ LJeputy Ciork 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba 
MCKAY-DEE HOSPITAL, MICHAEL 
J. HEALY, M.D., et al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 920904182 
Jury Trial 
(VOLUME II of XII) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
MARCH 28, 2001 
REPORTED BY: Jody Edwards, CSR, RPR, RMR, CRR 
238-7378 
MR. FISHLER: Objection, foundation. Can I be heard, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Do you want to voir dire? Do you want to 
voir dire? 
MR. FISHLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
And your objection is foundation as to the statement 
about if the patient were sent from the emergency room with a 
complaint? 
MR. BURBIDGE: It's just simply saying if she were 
sent the record would be there. 
MR. FISHLER: Well, then I may have misunderstood. 
THE COURT: Okay, well, I!11 allow you — was that 
the nature of your objection? 
MR. FISHLER: Hefs talking about whether or not the 
record would be available to the emergency department. 
THE COURT: All right. And so you may voir dire. 
MR. FISHLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
VOIR DIRE EX^MINATICN 
BY MR. FISHIER: 
Q Good morning, Dr. DeVore. Dr. DeVore, let me back up 
a moment. Are you board certified in internal medicine? 
A No. 
Q You testified earlier that you were an internist or 
•3Q1 
1 had an internship; is that correct? 
2 A Yes, sir. 
3 Q That was one year of training, correct? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And people that practice internal medicine go on to 
6 more years of training and then they take the internal medicine 
7 boards, correct? 
8 MR. BURBIDGE: Objection, irrelevant, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Yeah, I want you to concentrate on your 
10 objection and your voir dire pursuant to your objection. It's 
11 based, as I understand it, on foundation of his inability to 
12 opine as to what records may or may not be available in the 
13 emergency room. 
14 MR. FISHLER: All right. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 Q (BY MR. FISHLER) Are you board certificated in 
17 emergency medicine? 
18 A No, sir. 
19 Q Are there boards that emergency physicians can take? 
20 A I believe so, yes. 
21 Q Have you ever sat for the American College of 
22 Emergency Physician Boards? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Are you qualified to sit for the American College of 




Q Do you feel that you have sufficient training to take 
the boards? 
A In emergency medicine? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Do you know what training is required of a — an 
applicant who wants to take the boards? 
A I donft know -- I do not know the specifics. 
MR. BURBIDGE: My only objection here, your Honor is 
what we talked about is where the record would be and whether 
they would be accessible. It would have to be -- it goes to 
his knowledge of where the records were and who could access 
them. 
THE COURT: That very well — 
MR. BURBIDGE: I didn't get into who might want to or 
why they wouldn ' t. 
THE COURT: That very well may be your response, but 
right now I'm going to allow Mr. Fishier some leeway. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Okay, thank you, Judge. 
Q (BY MR. FISHLER) Are you familiar with — let me 
back up a moment. Are you familiar with what we call ACEP? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if ACEP stands for the American College 
of Emergency Physicians? Does that sound right to you? 
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A You just told me that, so I believe you. 
Q Okay. And do you know if they have guidelines much 
as ACOG has guidelines? 
A Well, I don't -- as I'm not a member of that nor have 
I participated, I would make the general statement that as ACOG 
has guidelines for us as obstetricians and gynecologists, I 
would assume that other professional organizations would have 
guidelines. 
Q And most members of ACEP would follow the ACEP 
guidelines and most members of ACOG would follow the ACOG 
guidelines? 
A I can't speak to that. 
Q Okay. Have you ever applied for privileges to work 
as an emergency physician, not a consultant in an emergency 
department? 
A No. 
Q In the last — okay. And have you ever become 
familiar with any of the texts, journals, or treatises, 
literature involving emergency medicine? 
A Only in the sense that as it relates to pregnancy 
complications. 
Q Are you current -- currently taking any continuing 
medical education courses in the field of emergency medicine? 
A No. 




field of emergency medicine? 
A I have. 
Q And what was the name of the book and what was the 
name of the topic? 
A It was a -- it was an article published in Obstetrics 
Gynecology that involved the care of patients appearing in the 
emergency room with what's called dysfunctional uterine 
bleeding. And it actually has become one of the classic 
articles on the use of hormones to stop bleeding in the 
emergency room environment in patients who present for that 
Q All right. And what was the date of the publication? 
A That was in the early -- late 80s. 
Q All right. Was that more than ten years ago? 
A Yes. 
Q When you worked in an emergency room, I think you 
told us back at Yale, did the emergency department have a 
full-blown emergency staff much like LDS Hospital or Cottonwood 
or the University would have? 
A The emergency room staff was — they did not have 
emergency room physicians as we do today. 
Q All right. So when you were working as a resident 
some 20 years ago in emergency departments, since that time how 
emergency departments are staffed, how they function, how they 










Q Do you know if at McKay-Dee Hospital there are any 
written guidelines concerning organizing liver function tests 
for the emergency department? 
A I don't know if there are any. I don't know. 
Q In your preparation to be here today, have you 
reviewed any literature involving emergency medicine standard 
of care? 
A No. 
Q Are you familiar with the ethical professional 
requirements of the American College of Emergency Physicians 
requires that if one is to testify against an emergency 
physician they need to be a board certified emergency 
physician? 
MR. BURBIDGE: Objection, foundation. 
THE COURT: Yeah, and you're getting a little far 
afield, Mr. Fishier. I want to concentrate and get your 
attention back on your original objection. The original 
objection, and I think that you have laid adequate foundation 
for the objection, the original objection was foundation as to 
how he would know what records go to the emergency room and 
that's about it. 
MR. FISHLER: All right. 
THE COURT: And I think that you've laid that as the 
foundation. 
MR. FISHLER: I think if your Honor says I'm done, 
•3Q£ 
1 I'm done. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. May I hear a response from 
3 Mr. Burbidge. 
4 MR. BURBIDGE: Yeah. It never came out. He was just 
5 saying that the records were over at labor and delivery and 
6 could be accessed. He didn't indicate that they were going to 
7 the ER room. I don't have any indication they ever went to the 
8 ER room. Nor did I want to withdraw that testimony from him. 
9 THE COURT: As I understand his answer, his answer 
10 was so that it would be available for the emergency room. Is 
11 that how you — 
12 MR. BURBIDGE: I had for anybody that wanted to 
13 access them. 
14 THE COURT: Is that how you read the answer — I mean 
15 how you took the answer, Mr. Fishier? 
16 MR. FISHLER: Yes. The question is how would he know 
17 that the ER could get over to labor and delivery and access the 
18 records? He doesn't. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, that's the nut of your objection. 
20 MR. FISHLER: That's the nut of the objection. 
21 Lacking that information, I don't think he can testify. 
22 THE COURT: Let me hear the response on that. 
23 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, the response is this, if he's 
24 the director of obstetric services at IHC and if he's located 
25 right there and the records are at labor and delivery, he can 
tell us whether or not somebody has access if they want. Now, 
whether they want it or why they want it is a different issue 
and I haven!t gotten there. 
THE COURT: Okay. The objection will be sustained as 
far as the answer in the discreet way in which it was answered, 
that they are at labor and delivery for the possibility of 
having others have access to those records. And that's as far 
as we got. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Fair enough. Okay. 
THE COURT: The other testimony regarding 
qualifications on emergency room may or may not be addressed 
for other argument later. Thank you. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Thanks. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED 
BY MR. BURBIDGE: 
Q I just want to reconnect with you. The prenatal 
records, Dr. Healy's prenatal records go over to labor and 
delivery November 29th, 1988, right? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Let me ask you this, from the prenatal records 
that were sent over, is there any way for anyone to look at 
that and say we know exactly when she'll give birth? 
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A Yes, you have. 
Q Okay. So let me ask you this as well, is there — 
let -- first of all, are there nurses' notes and physician 
notes as well? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And have you extracted those both nurses 
notes and physician notes? 
A I have. 
Q Okay. Would you put those up so we can look at those 
and explain what, if any, significance to the obstetric patient 
these have. 
MR. FISHLER: Objection, your Honor. May we approach 
the bench? 
THE COURT: As I understand the -- well, let me let 
the jury go and we'll talk about this because I have some ideas 
myself. 
So members of the jury, as you go to your second 
break of the day, please remember my admonitions. Do not 
discuss this matter with anyone. Do not allow anyone to 
discuss it with you. Please do not form or express any opinion 
on the matter until it is siibmitted to you for your decision. 
The jury is excused, the rest of us will remain in 
session. We will reconvene with the jury at noon. 
(The following proceedings were held in open court 
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if that is true, what's significant in there is irrelevant. It 
may be significant to him, but he hasn't linked it up as being 
significant to the ER physician. So I don't see how it's 
admissible. 
THE COURT: All right. And I don't -- and I don't 
know if it's premature or not, but I heard the question being 
what is in the charts that's significant to an OB-GYN and 
that's all he's saying. And that's as far as I'm allowing it 
to go right now. I have yet to hear the question has there 
been any breach of any emergency room standards. And then 
you're going to jump up. But all the question is, was it not, 
Mr. Burbidge, from P-l, 325, 326 and 317, from those records, 
what is significant to an OB-GYN? 
MR. BURBIDGE: What information is significant to an 
obstetric patient, I'm talking about the patient right now. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
*3Q£ 
1 MR. BURBIDGE: But let me just finish. I don't think 
2 I've been put through this screen by defense counsel like this. 
3 Dr. DeVore is going to testify that information was 
4 developed -- he's not going to go into triage, I don't care how 
5 the ER guy does triage, I don't know if he does this first, 
6 second or whatever. But Dr. DeVore is going to testify that 
7 certain information was gathered at that ER visit that sometody 
8 had to act on. Now if they want to say -- and he's going tc 
9 say based upon his experience in an ER -- and he doesn't have 
10 to be a board certified ER, he's an obstetrician, he's 
11 practiced in ERs, he's interfaced with ERs on obstetric 
12 patients. He's going to testify that the standard of care when 
13 you get that, I don't care how you do the triage, but when you 
14 get that kind of information, you can't sit on it. You have to 
15 act on it on an obstetric patient. Then it says follow-up. 
16 And he's going it say there has to be a follow-up with an 
17 obstetrician. We're not asking the labor and delivery guy to 
18 do anything with this patient. As a matter of fact, shouldn't 
19 be. But somebody has to follow-up. We don't know if he 
20 followed up. We do know that ER record is in Dr. Healy's file 
21 and the jury can draw whatever inference they want from that. 
22 Somebody had to follow-up. It doesn't just go into the 
23 atmosphere. 
24 MR. FISHLER: Your Honor — 
25 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
1 MR. FISHLER: The moment he says that given this 
2 information the ER physician has an obligation to do something, 
3 he's testifying as to the standard of care of an ER physician. 
4 That's the problem. 
5 THE COURT: And I agree with you on that. But is 
6 that what you're asking, Mr. Burbidge? I didn't hear you say 
7 that. 
8 MR. BURBIDGE: Well, here is the problem. What we're 
9 getting into, here is an obstetric patient that comes into the 
10 ER, right, and certain information is gathered about her. 
11 THE COURT: Right. 
12 MR. BURBIDGE: Right. Now, this particular 
13 individual is director of maternal fetal medicine, so a 
14 vertically-integrated program, I've laid foundation for that. 
15 Visits all aspects, watches patients through all, understands 
16 the custom and practice, what's supposed to be done with 
17 obstetric information about obstetric patients. He doesn't 
18 have to be an ER physician to know that the custom and 
19 practice, and it was uniform throughout all the major hospitals 
20 including the IHC facility, that if that kind of information is 
21 generated in an ER, however it's generated, once it's generated 
22 on an obstetric patient, somebody has to act on it. It can't 
23 just sit there and nobody do anything. 
24 THE COURT: And that's — and that's the essence of 
25 his objection, who acts on it. It has to be the emergency — 
1 if he says it has to be the emergency room physician who acts 
2 on it, that opinion is not going to be allowed. Because in my 
3 opinion he has a lack of foundation on the emergency room. 
4 MR. BURBIDGE: Okay, let me do this. This in your 
5 prior ruling, what you said is I'm -- in written ruling I'm not 
6 going to let you go into ER triage. 
7 THE COURT: Right. 
8 MR. BURBIDGE: Until it's determined that we have an 
9 obstetric patient on our hands, something like that. 
10 THE COURT: Right. 
11 MR. BURBIDGE: Now, in this record there is a 
12 reference to follow-up with Dr. Healy. Now, this ER doctor is 
13 going to come in and he's going to say, well, what I really 
14 meant by that, and I'm not buying it for a minute, is was I 
15 expected Shelly to take the platelet count and go over and 
16 explain all this. Okay, there's a reference in the record that 
17 he followed up with Dr. Healy, okay? Now, the question is, did 
18 he get important obstetric information? We know he followed up 
19 with Dr. Healy so he clearly recognized — there's a reference 
20 to follow-up with Dr. Healy. So whether he's sending the 
21 patient to Dr. Healy or he's supposed to follow-up himself or 
22 both, we know there's a recognition. 
23 All I'm trying to extract here is he got obstetrical 
24 information, there's a reference to follow-up, whether he dxd 
25 or not it should happen. Now, I have got it in the record that 
1 he did it or that there's a reference to a follow-up. And the 
2 question is, is there information there that's important 
3 obstetrically. 
4 MR. FISHLER: He's wrong, Judge, there is nothing in 
5 the record. It says F-U Healy and he's got his interpretation 
6 on it, I've got my interpretation on it. And we're going to 
7 call Dr. King and we're going to go to the horse's mouth. As 
8 yet there's nothing in the record that unequivocally says there 
9 was to be a follow-up. His argument that this man is at the 
10 top of some vertical organization and therefore can comment on 
11 everything down below -- CEO, we only need one witness, Judge, 
12 we need the CEO of IHC and he'll tell us everything. It 
13 doesn't make sense. 
14 The problem is is medicine is not a vertical 
15 situation, it's horizontal. 
16 MR. BURBIDGE: If you — 
17 THE COURT: I think Mr. Williams has not had an 
18 opportunity to add his objection. 
19 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, your Honor. My objection 
20 is based on relevance. There is no evidence at all that 
21 Dr. Healy was advised of the ER visit on the 12th. That he had 
22 any information from the ER visit on the 12th. There is no 
23 relevance to the observations he has about the obstetric 
24 condition in the emergency room unless that information was 
25 given to Dr. Healy, and there will be no testimony establishing 
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that. 
MR. BUKBIDGE: One more. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BURBIDGE: In the ER record it says follow-up 
with Dr. Healy, okay? 
THE COURT: Well, F U, or follow-up. 
MR. BURBIDGE: That's what it means. Doctors do that 
so we can interpret that. Now, that's just a plain record, it 
sits there, it's in evidence. Now Dr. King after the fact is 
going to come in and put a spin on it, but it sits there. The 
jury can interpret that one way or the other. Dr. DeVore will 
say physician does a plan, it's typical that the physician 
follows up with the plan. But however that may be, one way or 
the other, that emergency physician recognized he had an 
obstetric patient. Either his plan was to follow-up himself or 
have the patient follow-up with Dr. Healy. Okay? 
Important obstetric information was gathered. He 
doesnf t have to treat her. I don't know what ER doctors do 
when they treat them. But that follow-up with Dr. Healy 
needed, either through the patient or directly or both, needed 
to convey the obstetric information that was obtained. That's 
the .only reason for that follow-up. If he -- if it was just a 
cut on the hand, there's no reason to follow-up with anybody, 
you just patch it up and we're gone. That's what they're 
talking about. But we have a high-risk obstetrics patient now. 
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And the ER doctor has a reference to either the patient or him 
following up or both and all I wanted -- all I'm going to go 
through is is there information here that should have been part 
of that follow-up, that narrow. 
THE COURT: That should have been part of that 
follow-up? 
MR. BURBIDGE: Right. 
MR. FISHLER: The question is that he keeps doing it, 
he says -- he says that Dr. DeVore says the follow-up in an ER 
means this. Dr. DeVore can't -- with all due respect, Doctor. 
I don't believe he can do that. 
THE COURT: Sure. I agree with Mr. Fishier on that 
point and that's the — that's going to be the ruling. 
However, I will allow you to illicit testimony from Dr. DeVore 
as to what is contained in the emergency room records as of 
11/29/88 as you have referenced that is significant to an 
obstetric patient. And that's it. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Okay. 
THE COURT: And whatever -- and his explanation of 
the follow-up. But not that it should have been -- this 
information should have been given to them because that is the 
part of the ruling today and my other ruling in which I find 
that he was not qualified to testify about what emergency room 
physicians ought to be doing up until that time that he is 
consult -- m as a consultant himself for an obstetric patient. 
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1 called immediately when the results are available and he or she 
2 should be at the patient's bedside within minutes to evaluate 
3 that patient. 
4 Q Okay. And what can happen if that kind of attention 
5 isn't paid? 
6 A Because you're in a very dangerous area with low — 
7 this degree of low platelets, you can have spontaneous bleeding 
8 that can occur in the liver or the brain. 
9 Q Okay. Now let's look at the records starting in the 
10 morning, if we can, of December 14th, 1988. And we'll start 
11 with the nurses' notes, if we can, which is 226-B. 
12 THE COURT: Why don't you save that for our afternoon 
13 session. 
14 MR. BURBIDGE: Sure, I'd be happy to, Judge. 
15 THE COURT: Members of the jury, as you go to your 
16 last break, please remember my admonitions. Do not discuss 
17 this matter with anyone. Do not allow anyone to discuss it 
18 with you. Please do not form or express an opinion on the 
19 matter until it's submitted to you for your decision. The jury 
20 is excused. We'll try to call you back by 1:30. The rest of 
21 us will stay in session. 
22 (The following proceedings were held in open court 
23 out of the presence of the jury.) 
24 THE COURT: Please be seated. The record will show 
25 that we remain in session outside the presence of the jury. 
1 Pursuant to a discussion at side-bar and my ultimately 
2 sustaining the objection as to lack of foundation regarding 
3 Dr. DeVore's opinion as to what emergency room physicians 
4 should do, Mr. Burbidge requested an opportunity to proffer and 
5 I will allow him the opportunity to proffer what the evidence 
6 might have been. And I will hear further argument as to why it 
7 should not be let in. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Thank you, your Honor, I appreciate 
the convenience of the record. We believe that the record has 
shown here that Dr. DeVore is eminently qualified to testify as 
to the standard of care for anyone, any physician acting in the 
emergency room dealing with an obstetric patient with these 
presentations because she presents an obstetric problem. He 
has practiced in the ER. He has practiced obstetrics in the 
ER. He has observed the ER practice in a number of major 
hospitals, including those in the IHC system. 
There's a uniform standard of care when obstetric 
18 | patients appear with these symptomatology, however you got to 
them or however the ER doctor under Intermountain Health Care 
got to them, once he understood that she is an eclampsia 
patient and he has these findings, it must be acted on. 
Whether he does it or she does it or it's referred over to 
someone else who is going to act on them, the standard of care 
is uniform. ER doctors simply do not treat or deal with 






follow-up is mandatory and that's what he would say. He's 
observed it, he's seen it, he's dealt with it, he's taught it, 
he's learned it. And he's qualified to talk about it just on 
that one narrow area. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Burbidge. Mr. Fishier. 
MR. FISHLER: Your Honor, to recount the voir dire, 
he is not board certified in emergency medicine. He's not even 
board eligible. He doesn't have any -- had any training it in. 
He has never had privileges to work in an emergency department. 
When he did work in an emergency department back at Yale it was 
25 years ago. He's not familiar with any of the definitions of 
the American College of Emergency Physicians. He's never 
applied for privileges. He doesn't subscribe to any journals. 
He doesn't do current medical education in it. He doesn't even 
know who the leading authorities are. He's got his view of the 
way an emergency physician should handle OB patients. There's 
no one here that's an ER doc to say, no, that's what OB's do, 
that's not what we do. 
He last worked in an emergency department some 25 
years ago. If they wanted to take on emergency medicine 
aspects of this case, they very well could have retained an 
emergency medicine physician. But to make this stretch and if 
we — it's improper if you look at the case, and I have the 
citation here, it's not to be --


























and so — 
MR. FISHLER: Yes, it's an IQ test. Your Honor, 
there's a lot of things I won't take, but one of them is a 
hint. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Let me just conclude and then we'll be 
done. I read those cases too and it's really interesting that 
in each instance when the Court said that a doctor in one area 
can't testify as to a standard of care in another area, they 
simply said you have to lay a foundation that he's familiar. 
He doesn't even have to have practiced there. As a matter of 
fact, one of the leading cases never done the operation, never 
done the procedure, but could testify about how it could be 
done because he learned it, seen it, taught it. And that's all 
we're saying. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. Both sides have had the 
convenience of the record and my ruling still remains. 
MR. FISHLER: One other. 
THE COURT: You asked for a side-bar 
denied you. And what is it now, Mr. Fishier? 
conference, I 
MR. FISHLER: I've got so many people handing me 
paper here. My objection, Judge, was that Dr. 
that someone in labor and delivery should have 
I don't know if it was a platelets or an LFT. 
DeVore testified 
ordered a test. 
He said it was a 
4RQ 
1 deviation from the standard of care for L and D not to order 
2 that test. And I objected not because of foundation, but I 
3 objected because this is an opinion that has never been 
4 revealed to the defense to date. We have his affidavit and in 
5 his affidavit he sets forth all of his complaints against the 
6 various defendants. As we looked through the affidavit it 
7 doesn't mention this. Then in his deposition, his deposition 
8 he is asked, Have you told us all of the complaints you have? 
9 And he said, It's all set forth in the affidavit. 
10 Your Honor's suggestion that somehow — and I'll read 
11 the question, "What I want to find out is are there any other 
12 criticisms that you have of medical negligence that are not 
13 contained in the affidavit? I would -- Answer: I would do 
14 more elaborations and in more detail of those two points, and 
15 actually a third in the transfer of the patient to the 
16 University of Utah, which I think is contained in the 
17 affidavit. 
18 The problem with handling it on cross-examination, 
19 Judge, is I get up and cross-examine him and I'm going to go 
20 something like this: When did you come up with that opinion? 
21 He'll say, two days ago. What further cross-examination do I 
22 have? I'm not prepared to examine him. I haven't called a 
23 counter expert witness to counter this. So all I can say to 
24 that jury is is his opinion is no good, folks, because he just 
25 came up with it two days ago. That's all I can do on cross. 
1 It's got to be excluded. 
2 THE COURT: And — 
3 MR. BURBIDGE: Judge --
4 THE COURT: And I'm not going to exclude it. And I 
5 have much more faith in your cross-examination techniques than 
6 you apparently do in your own. But let me hear from 
7 Mr . Burbidge. 
8 MR. BURBIDGE: I will. 
9 MR. FISHLER: -Well, thank you, your Honor. 
10 MR. BURBIDGE: His deposition was taken twice so they 
11 mix, you know, statements made by Dr. DeVore in each one of 
12 those, that he indicated that he's reviewing all the medical 
13 records, there may be some elaborations on points. And he also 
14 testified that those tests should have been taken earlier. Now 
15 they didn't follow-up and say, well, who should have taken them 
16 and what personnel or what department. But he has already 
17 testified that when she appeared in labor and delivery those 
18 tests should have been taken based on the information they had. 
19 THE COURT: I've ruled, thank you. 
20 MR. BURBIDGE: I know you have. You invited and I 
21 took the opportunity. 
22 THE COURT: We're going to come back at 25 to by this 
23 clock and then we're out of here at 2:30. 
24 MR. FISHLER: The Court doesn't give comp time 
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THE COURT: P 20 will be the compilation of the 
Plaintiffs' demonstrative exhibits. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Thank you, Your Honor. And we have a 
set prepared for your Honor and a set prepared for defense 
counsel. And I'll hand that to the clerk. And with that, your 
Honor, we rest. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Burbidge. And as a 
comment on Plaintiffs' 20, the Court will reserve any ruling as 
to whether or not the demonstrative exhibits will accompany the 
jury and the Court -- I mean into the jury room. If not, it is 
still marked for further review of — appellate review if 
necessary. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: With the plaintiff resting — 
MR. CASEY: Your Honor, we just want to reserve the 
right -- we'll take a look at the compilation and let you know 
if it's accurate. 
THE COURT: Plaintiff having rested, defense. 
MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor. We'd like to move 
for --
THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, this is 
another matter of law. I'm going to excuse you momentarily 
while I take argument and hear the position of the parties. As 
you go to this early break, please remember my admonitions to 
you. Do not discuss this matter with anyone. Do not allow 
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anyone to discuss it with you. Please do not form or express 
any opinion on the matter until it is submitted to you for your 
decision. I'll try not to keep you out too long. Please rise 
for the jury. 
(The following proceedings were held in open court 
out of the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Be seated. The record will show that we 
remain in session outside the presence of the jury. The 
plaintiff having rested, motions by the defense. 
MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor, thank you. 
Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. CASEY: Your Honor, we would like to submit to 
the Court a motion for partial directed verdict. I'll provide 
counsel with a copy. And if need be we'll make sure it gets 
filed with the Court. With the clerk's office, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you can file it with my clerk and 
my clerk will stamp it. Is this the original? 
MR. CASEY: That's the original, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, then just remind me that I 
have the original. Okay. 
MR. CASEY: Very briefly, your Honor, the grounds of 
the motion are primarily twofold. When this case started the 
plaintiffs had three general areas of alleged negligence that 
was asserted against McKay-Dee Hospital. The first was the 
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emergency room. The second was the ICU. And the third was the 
transfer to the University Hospital. The plaintiffs sought to 
prove all three elements of the negligence claim through their 
expert testimony of Dr. DeVore, and that was basically it. 
As this Court is aware, Dr. DeVore's proffered 
testimony with respect to the emergency room at McKay-Dee and 
the care provided therein was precluded under Rule 702, and 
properly precluded. 
Furthermore, with respect to Dr. DeVore's proffered 
testimony with respect to the standard of care that would apply 
to Dr. Baughman's involvement in the decision to transfer the 
patient to the University Hospital and whether his concurrence 
in that decision constituted a breach of whatever standard of 
care would be applicable, the Court also precluded the 
testimony of Dr. DeVore properly under Rule 702. 
Your Honor, in both of those instances that was the 
only evidence offered by the plaintiffs with respect to any 
alleged breach of the standard of care in the emergency room 
and with respect to the transfer. We think it is very 
important that this Court make this decision at this time to 
clarify what's going forward with respect to the claims against 
McKay-Dee Hospital. There has been a lot of confusion put in 
this record with respect to what claims are being asserted 
against whom. And that confusion was only exacerbated during 
opening argument and during the examination of Dr. DeVore, both 
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1 with the objections to lack of foundation and the Court's 
2 rulings. And I think it's going to be important that for the 
3 parties and for the Court and the jury that this directed 
4 verdict motion be considered and granted. 
5 Secondly, in part of -- well, as part of the Court's 
6 decision if it so deems that the motion should be granted or 
7 even if it deems at this time that it shouldn't, we think that 
8 appropriate jury instructions should be provided to the Court 
9 so the jury is made clear that those claims are out of this 
10 case and that the jury is not asked to speculate about what 
11 came in from Dr. DeVore and what didn't come in. Obviously 
12 with this type of confusion the jury could be misled and I 
13 think it is important that that be clarified. 
14 With respect to the emergency room issue, your Honor, 
15 in addition to the fact that there was no credible evidence, no 
16 expert testimony provided with respect to the care provided in 
17 the emergency room, since Dr. DeVore' s testimony was precluded, 
18 we also think a directed verdict is a proper vehicle at this 
19 time because the plaintiffs put no evidence in, nor could they, 
20 that Dr. King, the emergency room physician, was an employee of 
21 or an agent acting on behalf of McKay-Dee Hospital or IHC. The 
22 fact of the matter is, your Honor, he was not. He was an 
23 independent contractor and under the law as we've cited it in 
24 our brief, McKay-Dee Hospital or IHC is not responsible for the 









no credible evidence that anything he did deviated from the 
standard of care since Dr. DeVore•s testimony was precluded. 
With that, your Honor, we would submit it to the 
Court and ask that the directed verdict be granted. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Casey. Mr. Frankenburg or 
Mr. Williams. 
MR. FRANKENBURG: No motion, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, no motion. This is only as to IHC 
involvement? 
MR. CASEY: Your Honor, we also had a proposed order, 
may I submit it? 
THE COURT: Sure. Thank you, Mr. Casey. 
MR. CASEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burbidge, Mr. Forgette. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Thank you very much, your Honor. This 
is a complex case made more complex by divergent opinions of 
the two defendants about what occurred. And the reconstruction 
of medical records despite what they plainly say. And spins on 
the medical records that seem to contradict what they plainly 
say. 
Let me take the ER first of all. There is an 
emergency room record that clearly indicates that Shelly 
Hipwell in her third trimester went to the emergency room. She 
went to McKay-Dee Hospital. She did not go to an independent 
contractor, she went to the McKay-Dee Hospital emergency room 
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there is an allegation that Dr. King may or may not be an 
independent contractor working in an emergency room in your 
opinion is irrelevant because it's the IHC staff and facilities 
that render the care? 
MR. BURBIDGE: Yeah. They were — they said they 
were going to call Dr. King. Apparently they're not going to 
call Dr. King. But she didn't go to see an independent 
contractor, she went to see McKay-Dee Hospital and they took 
her in, registered her in, whoever they hire to do their job, 
to do their bidding, that's their responsibility. 
THE COURT: Very well, thank you. Anything more, 
Mr. Casey? 
MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. BURBIDGE: Let me just make — I apologize. To 
get your Honor focused on that, the cases I talked about, if I 
go to my doctor, let's say Dr. King is my doctor, he's an 
OB-GYN and I go see to my doctor in the hospital, that's a 
different implication. That's not what these cases address. I 
don't address IHC running an emergency room, we have no control 
how they staff it and we have no choice of who they put in cur 
care. 
THE COURT: I understand, thank you. Mr. Casey. 
MR. CASEY: Your Honor, what's clear-cut here is the 
plaintiffs have rested. They had every opportunity to put in 
whatever evidence they felt they needed to put in. They could 
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have called Dr„ king and found out what his relationship was, 
what he did, what he didn't do. They could have asked Shayne 
as to whether when they went to the emergency room were they 
looking to IHC, were they looking to McKay-Dee. Or in fact 
when she saw Dr. King, did he think he was IHC, whatever. The 
fact of the matter is they put no evidence in, none whatsoever, 
that Dr. King is connected in any way to IHC. And in fact, we 
know he's not because he's just an independent contractor. And 
we've cited the cases here, your Honor. 
Secondly, about -- let's talk about what's clear-cut. 
And we have marshalled the evidence that we need to prevail on 
a motion for directed verdict. Primarily, being the exclusion 
of the proffered expert testimony of Dr. DeVore. Your Honor, 
it's not what Shelly expected or what Shayne expected back in 
1988 at this point. What is relevant on this motion is what 
did plaintiffs through their counsel put into the record in 
their case. The fact of the matter is over two years ago when 
Dr. DeVore was first starting to opine in this case they knew 
that we objected to his testimony in areas where he was not 
expertized, they knew that. 
They had full opportunity in this case to bring in an 
emergency room physician as an expert, someone qualified to 
testify as to the standards of care and any breach of that care 
and whether it caused any injury. We now are being told that 
the jury can draw a fair inference that the ER doc here did 
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something wrong because of some of the testimony that came in. 
THE COURT: Is there any evidence at all that there 
is any testimony or evidence to support the proposition that a 
standard was breached in the emergency room? 
MR. CASEY: There is none in this record, your Honor. 
And more important, there is no evidence in this record what 
the standard is. We heard what an intensivist might do or an 
OB might do, but as the Court initially ruled before trial, the 
issue here is did this ER physician do anything wrong faced 
with what evidence he was faced with. There is an absence. 
You know, there's a suggestion, your Honor, that if the patient 
was hypertensive — well, even the OB!s can't agree what's 
hypertensive or not hypertensive, or whether there was protein 
in the urine. Even the OB's can't agree as to what was 
abnormal or normal with respect to protein in the urine. And 
certainly there's some disagreement about epigastric pain. 
The fact of the matter is you can't ask eight lay 
people to decide themselves what the standard is and then 
decide whether someone breached it, that's just clear, your 
Honor. 
With respect to the transfer, if you look at 
section -- or Exhibits D and E of our motion or memo, the Court 
clearly excluded DeVore's testimony with respect to the 
intensivist role and the decision to transfer. It was admitted 
only with respect to an OB. There is a difference. And ag<iin, 
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your Honor, over two years ago plaintiff and their counsel 
could have called an intensivist to come in and testify with 
respect to the care provided by Dr. Baughman. Counsel chose 
not to. They rolled the dice and the expert, Dr. DeVore, his 
testimony in this area was excluded. Again, lay people cannot 
answer that question, the Supreme Court cases are clear on 
that. And directed verdicts in these two areas should be 
granted. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'm going to take it under 
advisement. Let's move on with the next witness. I'll take a 
break at 10:00 and then I'll take the bench outside the 
presence of the jury before they come back at 10:15 to announce 
this. 
MR. FISHLER: Your Honor, could we take like a 
five-minute break now to line up some exhibits? 
THE COURT: Can't we get on with 20 minutes of 
Dr. Baughman first? 
I'm sorry, Mr. Burbidge. 
MR. BURBIDGE: I apologize. There was one point 
made, and I don't know if your Honor would hear from me, that 
misstated the record. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BURBIDGE: And it's important. They indicate 
that the record is clear that Dr. King was an independent 
contractor. Of course there is no such record to that effect. 
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1 And when the Court asked is there any evidence on breach of the 
2 standard of care in the ER, there is clearly a commitment to 
3 follow-up. There is evidence that that's important 
4 information, clearly that is a breach. It doesn't have to be a 
5 physician coming in and saying this is the standard of care. 
6 This is a commitment contractually made by the ER and may or 
7 may not have been breached depending on the evidence. 
8 We would also like to proffer if we can 
9 Dr. Baughman's deposition, pages 17 to 22. He is an agent of a 
10 party, he's an employee of a party, he testified that he worked 
11 in the ER room, this is part of what we would have put on had 
12 we been permitted. Worked in the ER room, and based upon that 
13 experience would have followed up with the information that the 
14 ER doctor had. 
15 THE COURT: All right. 
16 MR. CASEY: We would object to that obviously, Your 
17 Honor, it's not part of the record. 
18 THE COURT: Very well. 
19 MR. FISHLER: Your Honor, could I have five minutes? 
20 THE COURT: All right. Don't you have just some 
21 preliminary questions of Dr. Baughman first and we can take a 
22 break at 10:00 and we can all have some time to think over 
23 things? 
24 MR. WILLIAMS: Can I remove that exhibit? I 
25 THE COURT: Yes. Bring in the jury. 
1 not allow anyone to discuss it with you. Please do not form or 
2 express an opinion on the matter until it is submitted to you 
3 for your decision. The jury will be excused until at least a 
4 quarter after 10:00. The Court has indicated that it will take 
5 the bench out of the presence of the jury at a quarter after 
6 10:00. 
7 (A brief recess.) 
8 (The following proceedings were held in open court 
9 out of the presence of the jury.) 
10 THE COURT: The record will show that we are in 
11 session outside the presence of the jury. Thank you for the 
12 opportunity to review my notes, the motion and my recollection 
13 of the record. Based upon previous rulings in review of the 
14 record and my recollection of my notes in this matter and 
15 previous testimony as to the emergency room, the fact that 
16 Dr. King may or may not have been an independent contractor in 
17 this matter is irrelevant as to the Court's decision. The 
18 record is is prior to argument, the record was silent as to his 
19 status. And furthermore, the Court did not find that to be 
20 relevant. 
21 However, as to the emergency room standards and 
22 breaches of the standards, upon review and upon my 
23 recollection, it is my opinion that there was no competent 
24 evidence that was elicited as to whether or not that treatment 



























breached any standard of care. And furthermore, upon my 
recollection and review there was no competent evidence as to 
what that standard of care may have been. Therefore as to the 
emergency room, the motion for partial directed verdict is 
granted. 
As to the transfer, however, the Court is satisfied 
that there is enough evidence on the record through competent 
testimony that the jury will have to make that determination. 
So denial as to partial directed verdict regarding the 
transfer. 
Draft up the appropriate order at the appropriate 
time. 
MR. CASEY: We will, your Honor, thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. With that, are we ready to 
proceed with Dr. Baughman? 
MR. FISHLER: We are, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(The proceedings were resumed in open court in the 
presence of the jury.) 









present and seated. » 
this matter. 
-. Baughman remains on 
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Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court precluded 
plaintiffs' proffered expert, Dr. Greggory DeVore, from testifying on the applicable 
standard of care regarding the care provided to Shelly Hipwell by an emergency room 
physician at McKay-Dee Hospital and whether that standard was breached on the basis 
that Dr. DeVore lacked the qualifications to offer such testimony. Without any such 
testimony, there is no competent evidence to support a finding of medical malpractice 
based on an alleged deviation of that standard of care by the emergency room 
physician at McKay-Dee Hospital. As a result, this Court grants Defendant McKay-
Dee's Motion for Partial Directed Verdict with respect to plaintiffs' claims that McKay-
Dee Hospital was negligent in treating Shelly Hipwell in the emergency room on or 
about December 12,1988. 
With respect to plaintiffs' claim that defendant McKay-Dee Hospital breached an 
applicable standard of care with respect to its role in the decision to transfer Shelly 
Hipwell to the University Hospital, the Court find that there is sufficient evidence to 
submit that claim to the jury. As a result, this Court denies defendant McKay-Dee 
Hospital's Motion for Partial Directed Verdict with respect to plaintiffs' claim that McKay-
Dee Hospital was negligent in connection with its role in the decision to transfer Shelly 
Hipwell to the University Hospital. 
F:\USERS\LAH\IHC-HIPWELL\OrderDirectedVerdict.wpd 2 
& > . DATED this ^ _ day of April, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
By 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
STRONG & HANNI 
Philip R. Fishier 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judde 
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY 
Richard W. Casey 
Andrew G. Deiss 
JAMES W. GILSON 
By_ 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
dba McKay-Dee Hospital 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Elliott Williams 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
By ^ ^ / A K 
Attorneys for Defendant 




Third Judicial District 
PR 1 2 2001 
LAKE doUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY JENSEN and SHAYNE 
HIPWELL, individually and on behalf of all 
other heirs of SHELLY HIPWELL, and 
ASHLEY MICHELE HIPWELL and 
KAYCIE SHAYLENE HIPWELL appearing 
by SHAYNE HIPWELL as guardian ad 
litem, 
Plaintiff, 
IHCHOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-DEE 
HOSPITAL, and MICHAEL J. HEALY, 
M.D., and DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 920904182 VCV 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the 
evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, 
answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence 
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any damages 
assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Michael 
J. Healy, M.D., negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "Yes," proceed to answer Question 
No. 2. If your answer is "No," skip ahead to Question No. 3. 
2. If your answer to Question 1 is "Yes," was such negligence a 
proximate cause of the brain injury to Shelly Hipwell? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
3. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell? 
ANSWER: Yes No /K 
If your answer to Question No. 3 is "Yes," proceed to answer Question 
No. 4. If your answer is "No," skip ahead to Question No. 5. If, however your 
answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 are "No," please sign the verdict form and notify 
the court. 
4. If your answer to Question 3 is "Yes," was such negligence a 
proximate cause of the brain injury to Shelly Hipwell? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If your answer to either Question No. 2 or Question No. 4 was "Yes," 
proceed to Question No. 5 and the following questions. 
5. Assuming the combined negligence of all responsible persons and/or 
entities to total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Defendant, Michael J. Healy, M.D. % 
B. Defendant, IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
dba McKay-Dee Hospital % 
C. University of Utah Hospital % 0 
TOTAL 100% 
6. If you have answered either or both Questions 2 or 4 "Yes," state the 
amount of general and special damages, if any, sustained by Plaintiffs as a 
proximate result of Shelly Hipwell's brain injury. 
General Damages: 
: Pain and Suffering of Shelly 
Hipwell from the time of her 
brain injury until the time of 
her death $ 
: Damages suffered by 
Plaintiffs as a result of 
Shelly Hipwell's wrongful 
death 
Special Damages: 
: Loss of Earnings 
(less consumption) 
: Loss of Household Services 
: Funeral Expenses 
: Medical Expenses 









DATED this / / ^ day of April, 2001. 
Foreperson 
STRONG & HANNI 
Philip R. Fishier (1083) 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801/532-7080 
BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY 
Richard W. Casey (0590) 
Andrew G. Deiss(7184) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 801/533-8383 
JAMES W. GILSON (1197) 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 801/533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
dba McKay-Dee Hospital 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Elliott J. Williams (3483) 
Kurt M. Frankenburg (5279) 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801/521-5678 
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. 
P i U I DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 h 2001 
i -> aALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKAY-
DEE HOSPITAL; MICHAEL J. HEALY, 
M.D.; and DOES I through X, 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 920904182CV 
(Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki) 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came for trial before the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, on 
March 27-30, April 2-5, and April 9-12, 2001. The jury of eight men and women was 
duly empaneled. The plaintiffs appeared personally and by and through counsel, 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. and Jason D. Boren, Esq. of Burbidge & Mitchell and Simon 
H. Forgette, Esq. Defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. appeared personally and by and 
through counsel, Elliott J. Williams, Esq. and Kurt M. Frankenburg, Esq. of Williams & 
Hunt, and defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, appeared by and 
through counsel, Philip R. Fishier, Esq. of Strong & Hanni, Richard W. Casey, Esq. and 
Andrew G. Deiss, Esq. of Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, and James W. 
Gilson, Esq. The parties fully presented their evidence and arguments and the jury was 
instructed and directed, pursuant to Rule 49(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to return 
a special verdict in a form approved by the Court. On April 12, 2001, the jury, having 
duly deliberated, returned the Special Verdict form, with six jurors having reached a 
verdict by answering "no" to the following special interrogatories: 
1. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant Michael J. Healy, 
M.D., negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
3. Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, negligent in the care of Shelly Hipwell? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
2 
Based on the foregoing responses of the jury to the special interrogatories, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants be 
awarded judgment of no cause of action on plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, 
thereby dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the defendants with prejudice and on the 
merits; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital, is hereby awarded judgment against 
plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $ , and defendant Michael J. Healy, M.D. is 
hereby awarded judgment against plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $ , both 
with interest accruing thereon as provided for by law until such judgment is satisfied. 
lis DATED this day of .,2001 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki, District 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
Simon H. Forgette, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially 
the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), contained similar language. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Pregnancy. 
Relation LO expert testimony. 
Cited. 
Pregnancy. 
The admission of a mother's testimony on the 
subject of gestation period of her pregnancy 
was not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
Relation to expert testimony. 
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a 
security guard, who compared a photograph of 
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at 
burglarized premises. The fact that a question 
might be capable of scientific determination 
does not make lay opinion inadmissible if the 
provisions of this rule are met. State v. Ellis, 
74S P.2d 188 (Utah 1967). 
Cited in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah 
Ct. App. 199S). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or oth-
erwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by la}r 
witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258. 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based 
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle 
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405. 
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testimony 
as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.Sd 575. 
Competency of nonexpert witness to testify, 
in criminal case, based upon personal observa-
tion, as to whether person was under the influ-
ence of drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905. 
Admissibility of lay witness interpretation jf 
surveillance photograph or videotape, 74 
A.L.R.5th 643. 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert b}7 knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the 
same. 
Cross-References. — Blood tests to deter-
mine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-45a-7, 
7S-45a-10. 
Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(b)(4), 
U.R.C.P. 
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in deter-
mining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4. 
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting 
number of expert witnesses, Rule 16, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Basis for opinion. 
Discretion of court. 
Foundation. 
Polygraph evidence. 














Basis for opinion. 
Testimony of expert witness who relied on 
conversations with witnesses out of court was 
admissible, since he may have meant he fourd 
statements of witnesses reliable for purposes of 
his making judgment. Lamb v. Bangart, 515 
P.2d 602 (Utah 1874). 
Facts or data used by a properly qualified 
expert in forming an opinion need not be :n 
evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied 
on by experts in the witness's field of expertise. 
Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Trial court did not err in allowing an expert's 
testimony relating to drug experience reporcs 
not in evidence. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Expert's testimony was properly excluded 
where witness was unable to give his opinicn 
based upon data made known to him at trial, 
as, absent personal knowledge of the facts, this 
was the only ground on which the evidence 
could have come m. Highland Consrr. Co. v. 
78-14-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
caused by improper postdelivery diagnosis, 
care, and representations, 6 A.L.R.5th 534. 
Medical malpractice: who are "health care 
providers," or the like, whose actions fall within 
statutes specifically governing action and dam-
ages for medical malpractice, 12 A.L.R.5th 1. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is 
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision 
of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could 
have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128, Cross-References. - Separate trial of stat-
§ 1. ute of limitations issue in malpractice actions, 
"Effective date of this act." - The phrase § 78-12-47. 
"effective date of this act" in Subsection (2) 
means the effective date of Laws 1976, Chapter 
23, which became effective April 1, 1976. 
A.L.R. — Liability for medical malpractice in 
connection with performance of circumcision, 
75 A.L.R.4th 710. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
medical personnel for death or injury to mother 
or child caused by improper treatment during 
labor, 6 A.L.R.5th 490. 
Liability of hospital, physician, or other 
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